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NUREG-1537, Part 2 - NRC

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6 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES<br />

This chapter gives the review plan and acceptance criteria for active or passive<br />

engineered safety features (ESFs) of the reactor facility that are designed to<br />

mitigate the consequences of accidents. The concept of ESFs evolved from the<br />

defense-in-depth'philosophy of multiple design features to prevent or mitigate the<br />

release of radioactive materials to the environment during accident conditions.<br />

The applicant determines the need for ESFs from the SAR analyses of accidents<br />

that could occur, even though prudent and conservative designs of the facility have<br />

'made these accidents very unlikely. The <strong>NRC</strong> reviewer' may find that the SAR<br />

analyses show that ESFs are not needed for a proposed design.<br />

Normal operation'of a non-power reactor is defined as'operation with all process<br />

variables and other reactor parameters within allowed conditions of the license,<br />

technical specifications, applicable regulatory limits, and design requirements for<br />

the system. Accidents at non-power reactor facilities generally assume a failure of<br />

a major component such as the reactor coolant system boundary or a reactivity<br />

addition event.' Licensees analyze a maximum hypothetical accident that assumes<br />

an incredible failure that leads to breach of the fuel cladding or a fueled eperiment<br />

containmment. These postulated accidents are compared to acceptance criteria such<br />

as the safety limits from the technical specifications or-, where there are radiological<br />

consequences, to accepted regulatory limits (10 CFR <strong>Part</strong>s 20 or 100). The results<br />

of the accident analyses are given in SAR Chapter 13, "Accident Analyses." ESF<br />

-systems must be designed to function for the range of conditions from normal<br />

operation through accident conditions.<br />

Because most non-power reactors operate at atmospheric pressure, at relatively<br />

low power levels,&and with conservative safety margins, few cedible postulated<br />

accidents result'in significant radiological risk to the public. 'Accident scenarios<br />

that should be discussed by the applicant in SAR Chapter 13 include the following:<br />

* loss of coolant<br />

* loss of coolant flow<br />

-' insertion of excess reactivity (rapid or ramp)<br />

* loss of fuel cladding integrity or mishaiudling of fuel<br />

* -failure or malfunction of an experirent<br />

* other uncontrolled release of radioactive material<br />

* loss of electri6 power<br />

* extehal events such as flo6ds and earthquakes.<br />

In the past, the SAk accident analyses for many non-power reactors have shown<br />

that ESFs are not required, even for ihe maximum hypothetical accident. In other<br />

cases, the accident analyses have shown'that ESFs need to be considered in<br />

mitigating the potential release of hazardous q uantities of radioactive material to<br />

the environment. '<br />

:6.1<br />

I REV 0,2/% 0.2/96 - 6-1

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