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NUREG-1537, Part 2 - NRC

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CHAPrEi 17<br />

need only state that all requirements of the license and technical specifications<br />

remain in effect and that the reactor will not be operated again.<br />

For other changes to the facility license and technical specifications, the major<br />

issue is ensuring that license and technical specifications requirements proposed for<br />

elimination or relaxation arejustified. For example, the license mayr propose<br />

elimination of the requirement for periodic power calibration on the grounds that<br />

the reactor will never operate again and porer calibration would be meaningless<br />

under these draumstances.<br />

Work is allowed to characterize the facility for developing the DP. Proposed<br />

characterization activities may be described in the possession-only safety analysis<br />

and limited by technical specifications. Dismantling a reactor is not permitted by a<br />

possession-only license amendment, so the reactor facility described in the<br />

possession-only safety analysis should be similar to the operating reactor facility,<br />

and the SAR should be referred to as much as possible. However, many of the<br />

components, instruments, and systems need not remain operable in the facility.<br />

Therefore, the possession-only safety analysis should state which of the systems<br />

covered by the SAR will remain operable and which will be modified or<br />

deactivated.<br />

The possession-only safety analysis should address potential accidents and<br />

provisions for limiting their consequences, if necessary. However, the acceptable<br />

accident scenarios for a possession-only safety analysis should be limited to ones<br />

credible for a shutdown reactor and for the residual radioactive material To be<br />

found acceptable, postulated accidents sfiould not subject the public or the workers<br />

to undue radiological exposure and should not exceed applicable regulatory limits<br />

(see Chapter 13 of this review plan).<br />

This discussion also applies to a shutdown reactor with fuel on site. Credible<br />

accidents that involve the release of fission products from the fuel should be<br />

anablzed. Radiological exposure from these accidents should meet the guidelines<br />

in Chapter 13 of this review plan<br />

The experience and qualifications of the personnel required to manage a<br />

permanntly shutdown reactor may be different from those required during the<br />

operating life of the reactor. The possession-only safety analysis should discuss<br />

the proposed changes in staff characteristics and other administrative requirements.<br />

The reviewer should refer to the appropriate chapters of this review plan for<br />

specific guidance on reviewing such topics as radiation safety and accident<br />

analysis.<br />

<strong>NUREG</strong>-<strong>1537</strong>, PT 2 17-10 Rsv. 0.2/96<br />

<strong>NUREG</strong>-<strong>1537</strong>,PART2 17-lo REV. O. 2/96

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