NUREG-1537, Part 2 - NRC

Acceptance Cnteria
INSFRUMENTAMON AND CONTROL SYMMS
Most non-power reactors can be designed and operated with'an acceptable small
or insignificant radiological risk to the public or to the environment. The SAR
should address the separation and independence of the RCS and the RPS with
consideration of the radiological risk of reactor operation, becauseithese systems
include most of the same types of subsystems and components and similar
functions. If the safety analysis in the SAR shows that safe reactor operation and
safe shutdown would not be compromised by combinationof the two systems,
they need not be separate, independent, or isolated from each other. In practice,
the reactor protection function for non-power reactors has been reliably
accomplished by adding an automatic trip and rod release subsystem to the RCS or
adding safety channels. Since many licensed non-power reactors have been
designed on that principle, this section of the review guidance is based on its
continuing applicability and acceptability.
The acceptance criteria for the RPS should include the following:
* The design bases for the protection function should be provided.
* Detector channels and control elements should be redundant to ensure that
a single random failure or malfunction in the RCS or RPS could not
prevent the RPS from performing its intended function, or prevent safe
reactor shutdown.-
* The logic, schematic, and circuit diagrams should be included and should
-show independence of detector chanmels and trip circuits.
* The RPS is sufficiently distinct in function from 'the RCS that its unique
safety features can be readily tested, verified, and calibrated.
* Technical specifications, including surveillance tests and intervals, 'should
be based on discussions and analyses in the SAR of required safety
functions: :
* The reactor should have operable protection capability in all operating
modes and conditions, as analyzed in the SAR. -For example, at low
reactor power, a reactor period scram may be needed to ensure that
inadvertent transients could not propagate risks to personnel or the reactor.
* The range of operation of sensor (detector) channels should be sufficient to
cover the expected range of variation of the monitored variable during
normal and transient (pulsing or square wave) reactor operation.
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