NUREG-1537, Part 2 - NRC

CHAPTER 10
dimensions, materials, angles of reflection, and material attenuation factors.
Exposure to radioactivity produced by experimental operations should be
consistent with the analysis in Chapter 11, *Radiation Protection Program
and Waste Management," of the SAR. The potential exposure from
malfunction or failures of an experimental facility must be within the values
analyzed in Chapter 13. Special radiation detectors used for experiments
should be discussed in Chapters 7, "Instrumentation and Control Systems,"
or 11 of the SAR or in the experiment protocol.
* For most non-power reactors, any required experiment or facility cooling
might be accomplished through convection heat transfer to the surrounding
reactor moderator or coolant water. The thermal-hydraulic analysis should
demonstrate that experimental facility cooling is designed to prevent failure
of the facility under all operating conditions of the reactor or the
experiments. Any interdependence of the experiment cooling and reactor
coolant systems should not compromise adequate fuel cooling or prevent
safe reactor shutdown.
For any experimental facilities that require a special cooling system
independent from the reactor primary coolant system, the technical
evaluation considerations should be basically the same as those for the
reactor coolant system. The applicable guidance in Chapter 5 of this
review plan should be followed. V
L At many non-power reactors, beam ports penetrate the reactor vessel
below the water level of the pool and in most of those cases below the top
of the reactor core. Therefore, the LOCA analysis in Chapter 13 of the
SAR is very important. The applicant should show that the design of
experimental facilities does not introduce new mechanisms to initiate a
LOCA, or that the potential consequences of a LOCA caused by the failure
of experimental facilities are considered acceptable by the Chapter 13
analysis. The applicant should show that fuel integrity would not be lost as
a result of a LOCA initiated or affected by the design of an experimental
facility or by the malfunction of an experiment or experimental facility.
* With regard to the experimental facility safety systems and the functional
interface between these systems and the reactor protection system, the
applicant should demonstrate that in the event of any credible malfunction
in the experimental facility, the design offers reasonable assurance that the
safety system will be capable of protecting the reactor, the experiment, and
the health and safety of the public.
* For any large-volume irradiation facilities, such as an exposure room or dry
chamber, an acceptable design should include provisions for (1) preventing
NUREG-1537. PAar 2 10-6 REv 0,2196
NUREG 1537.PART2 10-6 REV 0. 2/96