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NUREG-1537, Part 2 - NRC

NUREG-1537, Part 2 - NRC

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HEU To LEU CoNvRiow<br />

acceptable assumptions were used. The transport of fission products and<br />

other radioactive material from the core to the unrestricted area was'<br />

analyzeA,'and potential dose rates and accumulative doses to the staff<br />

members of the public, and the environment were calculated. All changes<br />

in the reactor parameters'and ESFs were included in the analyses.<br />

(2) The radiological consequences to members of the public in the unrestricted<br />

area and to the environment resulting from the postulated MHA for the<br />

proposed LEU-fueled reactor would not significantly exceed the<br />

consequences previously calculated and found acceptable for the HEUfueled<br />

reactor. Furthermore, the maximu projected dose rates and<br />

accumulative doses for the MHA exceed and envelope the radiological<br />

consequences of all other accidents postulated for this LEU-fueled reactor<br />

and are within the guidelines of that acceptable for the BEU MIA.<br />

13.2 Rapid Addition of Reactivity Accident<br />

At non-power reactors there may be the potential for the inadvertent or accidental<br />

addition of significant amounts of excess reactivity in an uncontrolled way.<br />

Among the reasons for this excess reactivity are the need for frequent power<br />

changes (including startups and shutdowns), experimental programs, and the need<br />

for versatility to accomplish these readily. The design and operation of a nonpower<br />

reactor requires systems, administrative controls, and procedures to limit<br />

the likelihood and magnitude of accidental reactivity additions.<br />

Areas ofReview<br />

The reviewer should consider the initiating events and scenarios postulated for<br />

accidental reactivity addition for the existing HEU-fueled reactor and the bases and<br />

criteria for selecting the ones with the most serious consequences for detailed<br />

analysis. The reviewer should evaluate comparisons of these considerations with<br />

similar ones for the proposed LEU-fueled reactor. The comparisons should show<br />

the parameters of the reactor fuel, core, operating characteristics, and procedures<br />

that affect the type and magnitude of consequences for postulated reactivity<br />

accidents in both HEU- and LEU-fueled reactors. Accidents can be grouped as<br />

either rapid addition of reactivity or slow (ramp) addition. The rapid reactivity<br />

addition includes rapid control or safety rod withdrawal or ejection, dropping a<br />

fuel element into a core vacancy, failure or dislodging of a component in the core,<br />

including an unsecured experiment, or a sudden change in coolant temperature or<br />

flow. A ramp reactivity addition could include any of the above on a slow time<br />

scale, such as continuous withdrawal of a control or safety rod by malfunction of<br />

its normal drive system, melting or flowing of an experiment from its intended<br />

location and configuration, or a slower change in coolant conditions that allows<br />

REV. 0,2196 45 STANDARD REVIEW PLAN<br />

RVv. 0, 2/96 45 -STANDARD REviEwPLAN

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