04.07.2013 Views

The Gas Vans: A Critical Investigation - Holocaust Handbooks

The Gas Vans: A Critical Investigation - Holocaust Handbooks

The Gas Vans: A Critical Investigation - Holocaust Handbooks

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

SANTIAGO ALVAREZ, THE GAS VANS 47<br />

2.2.2.4. Analysis of the Content<br />

– 2nd to 4th, 6 th , and 7th sentence: <strong>The</strong> last two sentences are pointless<br />

repetitions of the first three. Would anyone believe that a truck can<br />

be completely incapacitated after just half an hour of rain?<br />

<strong>The</strong> author of these lines might be hinting at the difficulties the<br />

German army faced in the east, but that had little to do with certain<br />

trucks skidding about. Road conditions in the Soviet Union were generally<br />

catastrophic during the war. <strong>The</strong>re were hardly any paved roads<br />

outside of major cities. In addition, the German army was not prepared<br />

for the Russian winter, so their motor pool, as everything else, came to<br />

a freezing standstill in November 1941. Diesel vehicles in particular, if<br />

not filled up with special winter Diesel or alternatively equipped with<br />

heated Diesel tanks, fuel lines, and injection pumps (which they<br />

weren’t), could not move due to the fuel being frozen solid. When the<br />

winter finally ended, the upper layer of the frozen soil thawed, yet lower<br />

layers stayed frozen for weeks to come. As a result any melt water<br />

and rain did not drain, so the entire unpaved road system of the Soviet<br />

Union turned into a huge quagmire, in which the German army got literally<br />

stuck. It was not before April or May 1942, depending on the region<br />

we are talking about, that weather and soil conditions enabled the<br />

German army to deploy their vehicles again with some reliability.<br />

Of course everybody involved in the war knew this, as this catastrophic<br />

first Russian winter halted the initial German thrust and was<br />

one major reason why the Soviet Union did not collapse in late<br />

1941/early 1942.<br />

It is very strange that the Becker document does not even hint at any<br />

of this. Instead, already mere humid weather conditions are claimed to<br />

have rendered the trucks useless because of skidding, when in fact getting<br />

stuck in the mud had been the big problem of all German vehicles.<br />

If what the Becker document insinuates here was German army standard<br />

during that war, they wouldn’t have gotten much farther than Warsaw<br />

with that kind of equipment!<br />

– 8th sentence: According to the author of this letter, sometimes the<br />

executees had to walk to the execution site, but at other times they were<br />

carried there by a vehicle. From this it has to be concluded that the executees<br />

and the gas van were at times brought separately to this spot. If<br />

the reason for this was that the respective gas van could not drive, then<br />

how did the van get to the execution site? Was it left there overnight?<br />

And if this gas van couldn’t move about, how did the other “normal”

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!