Interrogations-and-Confessions-Handbook

Why do Suspects Confess? Theories 121
Applying the decision-making model of Luce (1967) to the police interrogation
situation, Hilgendorf and Irving argue that decisions are determined by the
following.
i. Perceptions of the available courses of action. The assumption here is that
the suspect has more than one course of action open to him and he has to
choose between them.
ii. Perceptions concerning the probabilities of the likely occurrence of various
consequences attached to these courses of action. These are referred to as
‘subjective probabilities’.
iii. The utility values or gains attached to these courses of action.
These factors indicate that suspects have to consider the kinds of option that
are available to them. They have then to evaluate the likely consequences attached
to these various options. For example, if they confess are they likely to
be charged with the offence of which they are accused? If they insist on their
innocence is the interrogation likely to continue?
The decision-making of the suspect is governed by the subjective probabilities
of occurrence of the perceived consequences. In other words, decisions are not
based on what is objectively, or even realistically, likely to happen. It is what
the suspect believes at the time to be the likely consequences that influences
his behaviour. This means that one cannot assume that the suspect objectively
considers the serious legal consequences of making a self-incriminating confession.
An innocent suspect may confess under the misguided belief that since he
or she is innocent no court will bring in a guilty verdict and that the truth will
eventually come out (Gudjonsson, 1989d).
The suspect has to balance the potential consequences against the perceived
value (‘utilities’) of choosing a particular course of action. For example, would a
confession inevitably lead to cessation of interrogation and would the suspect
be allowed to go home? After confessing would visits from the family be allowed?
Hilgendorf and Irving argue that threats and inducements, even when
slight and implicit, can markedly influence the decision of the suspect to confess
because of the perceived power the police have over the situation and the
apparent credibility of their words.
Following the work of Janis (1959), Hilgendorf and Irving draw our attention
to the important finding in the literature that decision-making is not just
influenced by perceptions of utilitarian gains or losses; factors related to selfand
social approval and disapproval can also be very important psychologically.
Indeed, some authors, particularly those with psychoanalytic orientation (e.g.
Reik, 1959; Rogge, 1975), emphasize the role of social and self-approval utilities
in eliciting confessions. One illustration of the reasoning underlying the utilities
of approval and disapproval is as follows. In general crime does not meet
with social approval. Therefore confession involves the admission of a socially
disapproved act. However, for the suspect not owning up to an offence allegedly
committed by him can result in strong self- and social disapproval. Conversely,
being able to ‘get it off your chest’, and accept punishment for what one has
done, activates potential approval utilities.