Interrogations-and-Confessions-Handbook

Suggestibility: Historical and Theoretical Aspects 357
the Gudjonsson–Clark model are therefore more empirical than theoretical,
although his comments have theoretical implications.
Irving echoes the comments of Schooler and Loftus that the model could have
been more simply described, but his reasoning is somewhat different. He states:
. . . would it not be more parsimonious to propose that the phenomenon which
Gudjonsson and Clark want to label suggestibility, when it does occur, is merely
an extreme form of a compliant reaction? All that is required to incorporate this
suggestion into Gudjonsson and Clark’s scheme is to postulate that at low levels
of amplitude compliant responses (for example involving confabulation) do not
obscure the original memory signal (i.e. are not sufficient to interfere with recall
either at the time or after interrogation) but more extreme compliant reactions
produce noise so intense that original memory signals (recall) are obscured (Irving,
1987, p. 20).
Irving continues:
All the elements in Gudjonsson’s model are reducible or functionally equivalent to
the factors described as being pertinent to obtaining responses in suspects during
interrogation (p. 21).
The strength of Irving’s argument lies in highlighting the potential overlap
between the concepts of ‘suggestibility’ and ‘compliance’, and this point will be
dealt with in Chapter 14 in a discussion about the relationship between the
two concepts, in terms of both theory and empirical findings.
The weakness of Irving’s argument lies in his overlooking the main theoretical
difference between the concepts of suggestibility and compliance. The
difference relates to the personal acceptance of the information provided (see
e.g. Wagstaff, 1981). Unlike suggestibility, compliance does not require personal
acceptance of the information provided or request made. In other words, a compliant
individual behaves as others wish him to behave without believing in
what he is doing. In this respect, compliance is similar to Milgram’s (1974) concept
of obedience. Irving’s comment concerning extreme compliant responses
interfering with memory does not coincide with traditional definitions of compliance.
In other words, it is not easy to see how extreme compliance, which
Irving indeed relates to such work as that of Milgram (1974), can seriously
affect memory. This does not mean that compliance cannot under certain circumstances
affect memory. Indeed, the work of Bem (1966, 1967) indicates that
‘saying can become believing’, but this is more likely to occur at low levels of
amplitude response rather than at extreme levels of compliance.
Irving makes the point that individual differences are likely to be of little
importance during real-life police interrogation, because interrogators are able
to neutralize their effects by applying various tactics and ploys. He then goes
on to state, on the basis of his own observational studies, that tactics aimed
at individual differences may be ‘no more than the icing on the cake’ (p. 25).
The implication is that the reasons why people confess during custodial interrogation
are have nothing to do with the personality of the suspect. To Irving’s
credit, he does not argue that individual characteristics are never relevant or