Interrogations-and-Confessions-Handbook

536 A Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions
was in police custody over a three day period, or indeed what he may have
successfully invented or guessed himself. The case illustrates how powerful
one or two pieces of apparent special knowledge can be in terms of assumptions
that are made about somebody’s guilt. Of course, all that is required legally is
that the appellant’s guilt is the most reasonable explanation for his being in
possession of the special knowledge information.
From reading the judgment, I was concerned that their Lordships might only
have considered the impact of Pendleton’s ‘personality’ on the reliability of the
police interviews and not his vulnerable mental state at the time. Pendleton
was under a great deal of stress at the time of his arrest and during the police
interviews, in addition to being vulnerable in terms of his personality. Another
observation relates to their Lordships’ comment regarding the fact that I would
not definitively state whether or not Pendleton had made a false confession.
My reluctance to state that Pendleton had made a false confession relates to a
scientific reality. It is extremely rare that a psychologist or a psychiatrist could
categorically state, merely on the basis of a psychological evaluation, that a
disputed confession is definitively false.
Postscript
In December 2001, five Law Lords in the House of Lords heard the case. The
appeal was allowed and conviction was quashed (13 December 2001, UKHL
66). Pendleton was free after having spent 15 years in prison (Verkaik, 2001).
Mr Michael Mansfield QC had successfully argued on behalf of Mr Pendleton
that the Court of Appeal judges had taken upon themselves
. . . the task of assessing the fresh psychological evidence and so trespassing on the
exclusive domain of the jury. The Court of Appeal was in effect undertaking the
retrial of a case (p. 18 of The House of Lords Judgment).
Lord Bingham, who delivered the judgment, stated
No one can now be sure what would have happened had the evidence of Professor
Gudjonsson been available at the time of the trial. But the defence might in at
least three respects have been conducted differently:
1. The appellant might have been called to give evidence on his own behalf.
2. There would have been more searching questions asked about the appellant’s
mental state during the police interviews.
3. It seems likely that there would have been more detailed enquiries into
the unrecorded discussions and interactions between the appellant and the
police.
In light of these uncertainties and this fresh psychological evidence it is impossible
to be sure that this conviction is safe, and that is so whether the members of
the House ask whether they themselves have reason to doubt the safety of the
conviction or whether they ask whether the jury might have reached a different
conclusion (p. 22).