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Interrogations-and-Confessions-Handbook

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Psychological Vulnerability 475<br />

marshalled in the case of R. v. Raghip & Others (unreported, 5 December 1991).<br />

This expert evidence would clearly have been admissible on those issues.<br />

Mrs Tunstall <strong>and</strong> I were thoroughly cross-examined on our evidence. I explained<br />

to the Court that outward appearance can be misleading <strong>and</strong> even<br />

doctors are not always able to identify intellectual deficits without formal testing.<br />

The judges accepted our evidence. In rebuttal the Crown had called their<br />

own clinical psychologist, who had not actually assessed Ali himself, but had<br />

commented in detail on my report.<br />

The judges reviewed the fresh psychological evidence in terms of the three<br />

categories set out in Stafford v DPP ([1974] AC 878 at 907). These are the<br />

following.<br />

1. This fresh evidence puts such an entirely new complexion on the case that<br />

we are sure that a verdict of guilty would not be safe. So we will quash the<br />

conviction <strong>and</strong> not order a new trial.<br />

2. The fresh evidence though relevant <strong>and</strong> credible adds so little to the weight of<br />

the defence case as compared with the weight of the prosecution’s case that a<br />

doubt induced by the fresh evidence would not be a reasonable doubt. So, we<br />

would leave the conviction st<strong>and</strong>ing.<br />

3. We do not feel at this stage sure one way or the other. If this fresh evidence<br />

was given together with the original evidence <strong>and</strong> any further evidence which<br />

the Crown might adduce then it may be the jury—or we, if we constituted the<br />

jury—would return a verdict of guilty but on the other h<strong>and</strong> it might properly<br />

acquit. So we will order a re-trial.<br />

The judges were of the view that Ali’s case fell into this third category. They<br />

quashed the conviction <strong>and</strong> ordered a fresh indictment for a retrial. Six weeks<br />

later Mr Ali appeared at Cardiff Crown Court <strong>and</strong> pleaded guilty to manslaughter.<br />

A sentence of six years imprisonment was imposed. The nature of the plea<br />

was based on certain terms, including it being accepted that Ali suffered from a<br />

significant intellectual impairment, that the account given of his involvement<br />

by a witness who was present during the murder was accurate, <strong>and</strong> that the<br />

death of the woman might have remained a mystery if he had not come forward.<br />

This was accepted by the court <strong>and</strong> resulted in Ali being immediately released<br />

from prison after his guilty plea.<br />

Comments<br />

This is the only case discussed in this chapter where judges ordered a re-trial.<br />

There was no dispute that Mr Ali had been at the crime scene. The question was<br />

the extent of his involvement <strong>and</strong> whether he had been coerced to participate<br />

in the incident, which was no doubt instigated by his co-accused. Ali went voluntarily<br />

to the police after a Crimewatch programme revealing the discovery<br />

of the body, eight years after the murder. His downfall was that he was in the<br />

habit of lying as a way out of trouble, which had serious repercussions, when he<br />

was initially interviewed as a witness by the police. His tendency towards lying<br />

must have been apparent to the jury <strong>and</strong> undoubtedly made his testimony less<br />

credible, even if it were true.

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