Interrogations-and-Confessions-Handbook

Murder in Norway 609
interviewed by the police, when his own alibi was apparently repeatedly challenged
and he was trying hard to prove his whereabouts on the night of the
murder.
It is extremely unlikely that Mr A suffered massive (‘robust’) repression
about the murder without having some awareness of it (Brandon et al., 1998).
All the evidence in the case suggested that he had no such awareness.
The third possibility is that Mr A’s confession had resulted from a memory
distrust syndrome. This was the position I took in my testimony. As discussed
in Chapter 8, this condition is characterized by a confusional state where the
person’s confidence in his memory is seriously undermined and his susceptibility
to developing a false belief and a false memory are greatly enhanced. Mr A,
while in a vulnerable mental state and having problems with discrepancy detection,
was subjected to psychological manipulation and pressure during long
police interviews, which resulted in his making a false confession.
THE APPEAL
The appeal, which was a re-trial of the entire case, was heard by a jury of
10 persons and three judges. The trial lasted seven weeks, between 4 May and
17 June 1998. There was a civil case run concurrently with the criminal case
involving compensation to the victim’s family. This was a matter for the three
judges to determine and not for the jury. During the second trial there was
evidence from two British scientists concerning DNA found on two individual
hairs from the crime scene; one was found in the dead victim’s clenched fist.
The hairs did not match those of the victim or Mr A. This evidence supported
the defence case that Mr A was not the murderer. The prosecution claimed
there had to have been some laboratory error in the analysis, such was their
confidence in Mr A’s confession and his guilt. There was no evidence ever found
of a laboratory error.
During the appeal the appellant was the first person to give evidence. I listened
to him give evidence. He was rigorously cross-examined by the presiding
judge. Both the prosecutor and the presiding judge focused heavily on the incident
of indecent exposure that had occurred when Mr A was aged 15. He was
never charged with that offence, but it clearly became an important part of
the evidence against Mr A in the murder and suspected rape of his cousin. He
had remained embarrassed about the incident. It became public knowledge in
the small community where he lived. His previous history of indecent exposure
appears to have made him a prime suspect in the murder of his cousin,
especially after a psychiatrist, commissioned by the police, visited the crime
scene and spent two days with the police before Mr A was arrested. Apart from
the dubious confession there was no evidence against Mr A.
I returned to Norway five weeks after the trial started to give my evidence.
I testified on 8 and 9 June, immediately after the court had heard the testimony
of a Swedish police psychiatrist, who now gave evidence as an independent
court-appointed expert. His testimony lasted for almost a day and a half.
I listened to the psychiatrist’s evidence. He explained to the court his view that