Interrogations-and-Confessions-Handbook

The Psychology of False Confession: Research and Theoretical Issues 213
it is probably more related to lack of confidence in one’s memory. In contrast,
a false memory is highly dependent on the individual being able to create or
retrieve misinformation.
Imagination plays an important role in producing a false belief and a false
memory (Loftus, 2001). For example, Loftus and her colleagues have shown
that asking people to imagine that they had experienced a made-up event increased
significantly the likelihood that the person subsequently believed that
the event had taken place. This increased confidence that an event had taken
place after having been instructed to imagine the event has been named ‘imagination
inflation’ (Garry, Manning, Loftus & Sherman, 1996). There is evidence
that individual differences are important in imagination inflation. What are
the factors that make people susceptible to imagination inflation? Two different
factors have been proposed (Loftus, 2001). First, memory problems and
difficulties with reality monitoring (Heaps & Nash, 1999; Paddock et al., 1998).
Second, ability to produce vivid imagery (Horselenberg, Merckelbach, Muris &
Rassin, 2000).
On the basis of individual case studies (see for example Chapters 18 and 23),
I propose a third factor: namely distrust of one’s memory. As discussed earlier
in this chapter, Gudjonsson and MacKeith (1982) proposed the term ‘memory
distrust syndrome’ to explain this phenomenon. This group is not confined
to persons with poor memories, although persons prone to memory problems
would be particularly susceptible to this syndrome. Individuals with reasonable
memories may lack confidence in their memory, or the confidence they
have in their memory may be undermined when the recollection is challenged
by others. Confidence in one’s memory, although related to the complexity of the
task attempted as well as memory skills, is very flexible and may deteriorate
following demanding questioning (Saucier & Gaudette, 2000).
Most of the studies carried out into imagination inflation have shown a
change in belief rather than episodic recollection (Loftus, 2001). In one experiment
looking at both a false belief and a false memory concerning an event that
allegedly took place before the age of three, in about half of the cases the altered
belief was accompanied by ‘memories’ of the event (Mazzoni, Loftus, Seitz &
Lynn, 1999). The factors that determine whether or not a ‘memory’ trace accompanies
the altered belief are poorly understood. One possible factor seems
to be the number of imaginations used in the experiment (Goff & Roediger,
1998); as the number of imaginations increased the likelihood was greater that
the participants reported the actions suggested earlier in the experiment.
Recovered memories are by their nature potentially unreliable and the
English courts are reluctant to accepted unsubstantiated allegations based
on recovered memories (Gudjonsson, 1997d). Lewis and Mullis (1999) have
reviewed the legal problems involved in the prosecution of these cases and
provide important guidelines about how such evidence should be evaluated in
court. Lewis and Mullis present four legal options, referred to as ‘automatic
exclusion’ ‘pre-trial or voire dire reliability assessment’, ‘the identification approach’
and ‘testimony admissible’. In view of the absence of scientific consensus
about the reliability of recovered memories (see Davies & Dalgleish, 2001, for a
detailed review of the issues and controversy), Lewis and Mullis conclude that