Interrogations-and-Confessions-Handbook

The Psychology of False Confession: Research and Theoretical Issues 207
this position is different in the USA. This should be carefully studied in future
research. This readiness to confess is undoubtedly facilitated by suspects’ perception
of the likely evidence against them, combined with their own internal
need to confess, once they are at the police station. Within the Ofshe–Leo model
this group must fall within the voluntary confession group. Similarly, a heroin
addict who is withdrawing from drugs and wants to be released from custody,
but is not pressured directly by the police during interrogation, is presumably
giving a voluntary confession according to the Ofshe–Leo model.
The model is therefore of limited value in understanding confessions that
are voluntarily given, where a confession results from custodial confinement
rather than the interrogation pressure per se, or where the coercion to confess
occurs outside a police context.
There are some conceptual issues that need to be addressed. There appear
to be problems with the ways in which the terms ‘coercion’, ‘voluntary’ and
‘reliable’ are used. In particular, the terms ‘voluntary’ and ‘reliable’ are not
clearly defined and the relationship between the three terms, and the ways in
which they differ and overlap, are not discussed. This could be improved in
future work and incorporated into the Ofshe–Leo model.
From a psychological perspective Ofshe and Leo are restrictive in their use of
the term coercion and more or less restrict it to evidence of threats and promises.
They make a reference to ‘other classically coercive interrogation techniques’
(1997b, p. 219), but do not specify what these are. This is undoubtedly due to
their desire to avoid the over-inclusive use of the term, as found in the Kassin–
Wrightsman threefold typology, and their need to follow the necessary legal
usage of the term as documented in American legal judgments. It appears as
if the Ofshe–Leo social–psychological model has been forced into a convenient
legal framework stipulated by American case law.
It could be argued that coercion can occur without the presence of threats
and promises. Indeed, from a psychological perspective, coercion refers to a
situation where a person is compelled or forced to perform acts (e.g. make a
confession), which are against his will or wishes. Intimidation, relentless pressure
(including repeated robust challenges) and psychological manipulation
are overbearing techniques, which when extreme are highly coercive in nature
(Pearse & Gudjonsson, 1999).
In their article, Ofshe and Leo (1997b) appear to use the term ‘voluntary’
in two different ways, seemingly psychologically and legally respectively. As
seen in Table 8.1, it first relates to the type of confession (i.e. whether or not it
was elicited by the police or volunteered by somebody who may not necessarily
have been a suspect—a psychological classification), and second in terms of
whether or not the confession was coerced (a legal classification). This leads to
a further confusion. Why is a non-coerced–persuaded false confession classified
as being ‘voluntary/unreliable’, whereas a stress–compliant false confession
is rated as ‘involuntary/unreliable’? Although these two different types of false
confession are probably elicited by somewhat different interrogation techniques
and psychological vulnerabilities, both are similar in that intimidation, robust
challenges and psychological manipulation may have been involved.
Ofshe and Leo argue strongly for keeping true and false confessions within
the same decision-making model. I am not convinced by their argument. I think