Interrogations-and-Confessions-Handbook

300 A Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions
confess to a crime he had not committed. The court ‘found that the jury could
appreciate whether police interrogation techniques were suggestive by themselves
and that Dr Traugott’s testimony would invade the prerogative of the
jury to assess [the officers’] credibility’. 59
Importantly the trial court had excluded altogether the testimony of
Dr Richard Ofshe, who was offered as a social psychologist expert in the field
of coercive police investigation techniques and the phenomenon of false or coerced
confessions. The trial court opined that the testimony would amount to a
judgment of the interrogating officers’ credibility about what happened during
the interrogation and that it ‘would add nothing to what the jury would know
from common experience’. 60
After Hall was convicted, the appellate court reversed the judgment, finding
that the trial court had not applied the correct standards under Daubert, and
that this error was not harmless where ‘Dr Ofshe’s testimony went to the heart
of Hall’s defence’. 61
The trial court had rejected or limited the expert testimony using the traditional
criteria of whether the testimony would ‘usurp’ the jury’s function of
judging the witness’s credibility, and whether it would add to what the jury
knew from common experience. The appellate court pointed out that, under
the broader standards of Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence, expert
evidence need only be helpful to the jury and relevant to an issue in the case.
Thus, there was ‘no categorical reason to exclude expert testimony that bears
on truthfulness’, if, under the facts of a particular case, the testimony could
give the jury ‘a reason to reject the common sense evaluation of the facts that
they would otherwise be entitled to use’. 62 Furthermore, expert testimony need
not be excluded just because the subject matter was within the jury’s own
knowledge, particularly if the testimony challenged the jury’s common-sense
beliefs:
This ruling overlooked the utility of valid social science. Even though the jury may
have had beliefs about the subject, the question is whether those beliefs are correct.
Properly conducted social science research often shows that commonly held beliefs
are in error. Dr Ofshe’s testimony, assuming its scientific validity, would have
let the jury know that a phenomenon known as false confessions exists, how to
recognize it, and how to decide whether it fits the facts of the case (p. 13).
The appellate court accordingly remanded Hall’s case to the trial court for a new
trial to be preceded by a new hearing applying the Daubert factors to determine
whether Dr Ofshe’s evidence was admissible. 63 Although Kumho Tire had not
yet been decided at the time, the hearing court held that the framework of
Daubert was applicable to the social sciences, even if these disciplines ‘rely primarily
on real-world experience’, including systematic observation and analysis,
rather than controlled experimentation to arrive at their conclusions. 64 The
59 Hall I at 1341.
60 Hall I at 1341.
61 Hall I at 1345.
62 Hall I at 1344 (citing United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 1995)).
63 Hall II at 1199.
64 Hall II at 1202.