Interrogations-and-Confessions-Handbook

The American Law on Confessions 285
Voluntariness was apparently completely severed from the question of reliability
when the Supreme Court held in Colorado v. Connelly that ‘free and
rational choice’ means only the absence of intimidation, coercion or deception
by the police or other government actor. 6 Thus, a confession by a man suffering
from psychotic delusions, although clearly of dubious reliability and not
the product of any rational choice, was nevertheless held admissible because
no police misconduct had been involved. The reliability of a confession, according
to Connelly, is a matter of evidentiary law and a separate question from
voluntariness. 7
To decide whether a confession is voluntary, a court looks at the ‘totality
of the circumstances’ surrounding the interrogation. The court will consider a
combination of factors, such as the characteristics of the accused, the conditions
of the interrogation and the conduct of the police. 8 ‘The determination
depends upon a weighing of the circumstances of pressure against the power of
resistance of the person confessing.’ 9 Under this test, the court must consider
any particular vulnerabilities of the suspect such as youth, mental retardation
or mental illness, in addition to such factors as the length of the questioning,
whether food or breaks were allowed and whether the police made improper
threats or promises. These factors are discussed in detail by Brophy and Huang
(2000), Florian (1999), Mcguire (2000), Meyer (1999), White (1998).
Voluntariness Under Miranda
Undoubtedly, the most important and controversial decision in American law
with regard to confessions was Miranda v. Arizona, 10 which attempted to create
a ‘bright line’ test of voluntariness by requiring the police to inform suspects in
custody prior to interrogation that they had a constitutional right not to answer
questions about the crime and a right to have a lawyer present. According to
Stuntz, the Supreme Court intended to achieve two objectives by its decision in
Miranda: deterring police misconduct, and providing suspects in custody with
the opportunity to make informed and rational decisions about whether to incriminate
themselves (Stuntz, 1989). Miranda, citing numerous documented
instances of brutal methods used by the police to extract confessions, observed
that these examples ‘are undoubtedly the exception now, but they are sufficiently
widespread to be the object of concern’. 11 The Court went on to criticize
psychological techniques capable of overbearing the suspect’s will, quoting extensively
from police interrogation manuals, including Inbau and Reid, about
such deceptive techniques as ‘Mutt and Jeff’ described in Chapter 1, or staging
a line-up where fictitious witnesses or victims would identify the suspect with
unrelated crimes to make him ‘desperate’ enough to confess to the crime under
6 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 US 157 (1986).
7 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 US at 167.
8 Shneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 US 218 (1973).
9 Dickerson v. United States, 530 US 428, 434 (2000) (citing Stein v. New York, 346 US 156).
10 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).
11 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US at 447.