Interrogations-and-Confessions-Handbook

Suggestibility: Historical and Theoretical Aspects 341
progressive weights and lines, as well as his ‘prestige’ and ‘interrogatory’ tests,
were assumed by him to include:
1. obedience to mental influence from another person,
2. the tendency to imitate,
3. influence of a preconceived idea that paralysed the individual’s critical
sense and
4. expectative attention.
Stukat (1958) found some support for Binet’s theoretical formulation from his
factorial studies, where the first two categories (1 and 2 above) were quite
similar to Stukat’s ‘need for conformity’ factors and the last two (3 and 4) corresponded
to an ‘expectative’ factor.
McDougall (1908), whose definition of suggestion was given earlier, associates
suggestibility with four distinct conditions:
1. abnormal states of the brain (e.g. as during hypnosis, sleep and fatigue);
2. deficiency and poor organization of knowledge regarding the subject matter
being communicated;
3. the impressive character of the person communicating the suggestion (i.e.
‘prestige’ suggestion) and
4. the character and disposition of the subject.
McDougall thought of the relative strengths of ‘instincts’, ‘assertion’ and
‘subjection’ as the most crucial conditions determining the individual’s level
of suggestibility. For example, an individual with a strong impulse of selfassertion
when communicating with others of lower status makes the former
non-suggestible to the influence of the latter. McDougall also emphasized the
importance of the person’s knowledge, and confidence in his knowledge, as mediating
variables in the susceptibility to suggestion. McDougall’s emphasis on
both motivation and cognitive factors in determining suggestibility is fundamental
to the understanding of secondary suggestibility, including interrogative
suggestibility.
Another theoretical model of relevance to secondary suggestibility is that of
Sherif (1936). He argues that a stimulus is never reacted to in isolation. It is
always experienced, perceived, judged and reacted to in relation to other stimuli,
present or past, to which it is fundamentally related. Sherif used the term
‘frame of reference’ to denote these functionally related factors that influence
perceptions and judgements,
Coffin (1941) has expanded Sherif’s theory. He regards suggestion as a
framework response, determined by internal factors (e.g. attitude) and external
features of the stimulus situation. When a situation is ‘well structured’
in terms of either attitudinal or situational factors, only those suggestions
which accord with the existing frame of reference are likely to be accepted.
The advantage of the cognitive model of Sherif and Coffin is that it is conceptually
simple and seems to explain many experimental findings. A possible
weakness is the strong emphasis on the cognitive aspects of internal
factors, because even though suggestions may well function as a frame of reference
usually there are emotional and motivational factors involved in the