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Interrogations-and-Confessions-Handbook

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Psychological Vulnerability 467<br />

However, the appeal judges carefully differentiated between psychiatric or psychological<br />

evidence addressing a defendant’s mens rea (guilty intent) <strong>and</strong> evidence<br />

going to the reliability of a confession. The question posed above by the<br />

judges about a defendant’s mental condition should only be asked in relation<br />

to reliability of confession evidence.<br />

Their ruling also broadened the criteria for defining ‘mental h<strong>and</strong>icap’ under<br />

Section 77 of PACE. The judges were ‘not attracted to the concept that the<br />

judicial approach to submissions under 76(2)(b) of PACE should be governed by<br />

which side of an arbitrary line, whether at 69/70 or elsewhere, the IQ falls’. This<br />

contradicted the ‘judge for yourself’ approach in respect of the jury outlined in<br />

Masih ([1986], Crim.L.R. 395), which read as follows:<br />

where the defendant however is within the scale of normality albeit as this man<br />

was, at the lower end of the scale, expert evidence in our judgment is not as a rule<br />

necessary <strong>and</strong> should be excluded.<br />

At the end of the judgment the judges emphasized the need for solicitors to seek<br />

a further report if they believed the opinion of the previous expert was hostile<br />

or apparently defective. They concluded with regard to Raghip’s case:<br />

At the date of trial in this case two medical experts had been consulted on behalf<br />

of Raghip <strong>and</strong> because of the content of their reports, neither was called to give<br />

evidence. Yet at a much later stage, after having seen Dr Gudjonsson’s report both<br />

experts changed the opinions they had previously given. In these circumstances<br />

it is demonstrated that the need of a third opinion was necessary in the interests<br />

of justice.<br />

The convictions of the two co-defendants, Silcott <strong>and</strong> Braithwaite, were also<br />

quashed, but not on psychological grounds. Braithwaite had been unlawfully<br />

refused access to a solicitor in breach of Section 58 of PACE <strong>and</strong> the relevant<br />

paragraph of the Code of Practice. The entire evidence against Silcott<br />

consisted of an alleged incriminating text in the last police interview, which<br />

police evidence said was contemporaneously recorded. Electrostatic detection<br />

apparatus (ESDA) clearly showed irregularities with regard to the recording<br />

of the interview. The ESDA technique examines the depression made<br />

on one page from the writing on another page which rests on it. It shows<br />

whether the records have been altered after the original statement was<br />

written.<br />

Comments<br />

What does Raghip’s case teach us about the clinical assessment of retracted<br />

confession cases? There are two important lessons to be learned. Firstly, we<br />

cannot rely on clinical impressions of intellectual functioning. As was shown in<br />

Chapter 3, often such impressions are wrong. In all fairness to the psychiatrist<br />

involved, he did identify Raghip’s reading problems <strong>and</strong> his poor vocabulary,<br />

<strong>and</strong> considered him susceptible to suggestion. Furthermore, most importantly,

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