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Interrogations-and-Confessions-Handbook

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The English Law on <strong>Confessions</strong> 251<br />

Definition of a Confession in PACE<br />

PACE attempts to provide a working definition of the word ‘confession’. It is<br />

construed in Section 82 (1) as including<br />

. . . any statement wholly or partly adverse to the person who made it, whether<br />

made to a person in authority or not <strong>and</strong> whether made in words or otherwise<br />

(Home Office, 1985a, p. 75).<br />

The terminology used in the Act to define a confession is very broad <strong>and</strong> implies<br />

that self-incriminating admissions, which fall short of a full confession, are<br />

also classified under the heading of a confession. Since under certain circumstances<br />

exculpatory statements, such as denials, can be construed as adverse<br />

<strong>and</strong> may even be used against defendants as evidence of deliberate lying <strong>and</strong><br />

guilt (Gudjonsson, 1995c), this would also appear to fall under the above definition<br />

of a ‘confession’. However, incriminating denials cannot meaningfully be<br />

described as a ‘confession’ <strong>and</strong> ought to be dealt with under Section 78 of PACE<br />

(Gudjonsson, 1993a). This is recognized in the leading legal authority Archbold<br />

(Richardson, 2001):<br />

The approach in R. v. Sat-Bhambra, ante, that exculpatory statements are not to be<br />

treated as confessions for the purposes of Section 76 simply because they are used<br />

against the defendant at trial as false or inconsistent statements, was confirmed<br />

in R. v. Park, 99 Cr.App.R. 270, CA. Aliter, in the case of remarks which, whilst<br />

not amounting to a confession of guilt, would only be made by a guilty person: see<br />

R. v. Cox, 96 Cr.App.R. 464 at 474, CA (p. 1482).<br />

However, it is suggested in Archbold that<br />

The definition in section 82(1) is not exhaustive: the expression ‘made in words<br />

or otherwise’ may include, it is submitted, a defendant’s failure to respond to<br />

questioning from which an adverse inference may be drawn under sections 34,<br />

36 or 37 of the Criminal Justice <strong>and</strong> Public Order Act 1994 (Richardson, 2001,<br />

p. 1482).<br />

It seems extraordinary to be suggesting that a defendant, who is exercising his<br />

right of silence by declining to answer questions, may be construed as making<br />

an expression that falls under the heading of a ‘confession’. This can be<br />

attributed to the vagueness <strong>and</strong> broad nature of the definition in Section 82(1)<br />

<strong>and</strong> illustrates how important interpretations are in relation to legal concepts.<br />

Challenges to Admissibility<br />

As far as the admissibility of confession evidence is concerned, this may be<br />

challenged in one or more of four ways (Richardson, 2001). The first two tests<br />

relate to Section 76(2)(a) <strong>and</strong> (2)(b) of PACE <strong>and</strong> other tests invoke Sections<br />

78(1) <strong>and</strong> 82(3). Section 76 states:<br />

If, in any proceedings where the prosecution proposes to give in evidence a confession<br />

made by an accused person, it is represented to the court that the confession<br />

was or may have been obtained—

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