tru democrafliile moderne. – În esenflæ, drepturile omului øi contractul social(în diversele lui ipostaze 1 ). Adicæ ficfliunile regulative a cæror restaurarea fost, tocmai, cæutatæ (mai mult sau mai puflin obscur, naiv), dupæ „alterarea“lor de cætre comunism (care nici el, în ficfliunea juridicæ a funcflionæriisale normalizate, nu le abrogase, et pour cause!). Cu alte cuvinte, acea fondarece nu ne poate institui ca subiecflii autonomi (deplini, autodeterminaflietc.) ce trebuie, cu necesitate, sæ fim pentru a ne fructifica existenfla (Dasein/Mitdaseinøi In-der-Welt-sein) în forma ei modernæ – pe orice laturæ asa am dori s-o luæm: eticæ, juridicæ, politicæ, economicæ, dezirantæ, libidinalæ,culturalæ etc. –, altfel decît luîndu-ne în paza ei ca membri deja adulfli, prindefiniflie, indiferent de vîrsta naturalæ – abia aøa existæ drepturi øi ale copilului2 –, ai unor corpuri sociale, productive, civile øi, bineînfleles, politice constituiteeminamente „terestru“, pur „omeneøte“. Acestea rejecteazæ astfel,prin naturæ, paternajul transcendent (delegitimînd de asemenea, în sînul lor,orice pretenflie de autoritate ce s-ar înfæfliøa ca pur paternæ ori paternalistæ)øi tind deci sæ videze de eficienflæ (ca øi de sens) orice garanflie surplombantæa realitæflii forflelor øi lianflilor ce le agregæ. (Asta nu înseamnæ, bineînfleles,cæ forclusul nu se poate întoarce, tocmai, ca exterioritatea cea mai puræ.)Øi tot de aceea, nici eliberarea (în sensul normativ al libertæflii, niciodatæ suficientpentru animalul deopotrivæ narcisic øi gregar ce sîntem: de partaj færædistribuflie al ei, prin care sîntem astfel „legafli“ unii de ceilalfli exact în mæsuraîn care nu depindem personal de aceøtia) øi nici, mai ales, emanciparea (ase citi „majoratul“) nu-i sînt în genere accesibile omului modern decît cu unprefl sever. Poate chiar exorbitant, însæ de neocolit. Acela al asumærii faptuluicæ el, omul modernitæflii, nu e, în ultimæ instanflæ, decît „orfanul“ (færæde pærinte al) propriei condiflii.E una din consecinflele ineluctabile ale descinderii lui – ale configurærii lui catip de umanitate (cum ar zice Husserl) – înainte de orice din propria lui formæ(formulæ) de existenflæ; aøadar, din propria lui lume istoricæ øi moralæ: aceeacare îl postuleazæ din capul locului ca adult care se face singur øi care, la rîndullui, n-o repetæ în sine øi n-o poartæ mai departe (n-o „înmulfleøte“ øin-o desfæøoaræ: structural, ca timp, ca spaflii) decît pe aceasta. Avîndu-øi propriaexistenflæ ca „pærinte“, el n-o perpetueazæ, n-o reproduce decît pe eaøi tot doar pe ea o „moøteneøte“. (În acest sens, el se moøteneøte, în fond,numai pe sine, precizîndu-øi astfel øi dezvæluindu-øi doar mai bine felul dea fi, ce „are“ mai propriu, pe mæsuræ ce ea îl expune mai amænunflit, maidepliat – în vreme ce el, la rîndul sæu, o desfæøoaræ –, iar ambii îøi actualizeazæpotenflialitæflile, împlinindu-se în tandem, cæci, la fel ca lumea lor, temporalitatea,respectiv istoricitatea lor e una øi aceeaøi.) În felul acesta,„matur(iz)area“ sa (deopotrivæ în/ca istoria lumii øi în cea a multiplicærii saleindividuate), devenirea sa subiect, adicæ modul de a „se (presu)pune“ careel este deja, prin destin(are) – øi aici vorbim deja de subiectul efectiv, singular,al propriei sale existenfle (je meines: „de fiecare datæ al meu“), øi al existenfleica atare (cel ce era întrucîtva mistificat prin ficfliunea originaræ care-iprescrie inserfliile, nici ele nemæsluite, în ordinea istorico-empiricæ a lumii:prin aceea cæ-l voia nu doar adult, ci øi desævîrøit, complet autodeterminat,perfect ajuns la sine) –, nu este altceva decît integrarea pe parcursul viefliifiecæruia a acestei condiflii orfeline: învæflarea ei (învæflarea cu ea). (Din rafliunide concizie, simplific desigur desenul argumentului øi merg drept la flintæ.Bunæoaræ, atunci cînd mæ refer la singularitatea de existenflæ care e fiecare/oricaredintre noi – revelatoare, în plus, de traseu istoric condensînd însine o lungæ emergenflæ de epocæ –, asta nu înseamnæ nici solipsism, niciending – under the guillotine – of the despot’s felony towards the genuinesovereign uprisen to reclaim his usurped right), but even from the “negative(political) theology” inherent to the fiction which is the immanent ground forthe rights and liberties constitutive of modern democracies. – In essence,human rights and the social contract (in its various hypostases 1 ), namely theregulative fictions whose restoration was looked for, on purpose (although notwithout confusion), after they were “altered” by communism (which hadn’tabolished them either, in the juridical fiction of its normal activity, et pourcause!). In other words, the foundation which can institute us as the autonomoussubjects (complete, self-determined, etc.) we necessarily have to be,in order to fructify our existence (Dasein/Mitdasein and In-der-Welt-sein) in itsmodern form – in any of its aspects that we approach: ethical, juridical, political,economical, desiring, libidinal, cultural, etc. –, in a single way: by takingus in its care as already adult members, regardless of our natural age – that’sthe only way there are children rights, as well 2 – of social, productive, civil and,of course, political bodies established pre-eminently in a “terrestrial”, purely“human” way. So all these reject, by nature, any transcendent fatherhood(and also de-legitimatize, intrinsically, any claim of authority made as merelypaternal or paternalist); moreover, they tend then to remove the efficiency(and meaning), too, from any overlooking guarantees for the realityof the forces and the bonding which aggregates them. (That doesn’t mean, ofcourse, that the forclosed cannot return precisely as the purest exteriority.)And for the same reason, neither the liberation (in the normative sense offreedom, never sufficient for the narcissistic and gregarious animal that weare: as partaking without sharing it, by which we are “tied” to each other inasmuchas we don’t personally depend on the others), and especially not theemancipation (or “coming of age”) are, generically, accessible to the modernman but at a high cost. Perhaps exorbitant, but unavoidable: acknowledging– that is assuming – the fact that, in the last resort, modernity’s human being,is nothing but “the orphan” (with no parent) of his own condition.It is one of the ineluctable consequences of his descent – of his configurationas a type of humanity (as Husserl would say) – before anything from its ownform (formula) of existence; therefore from his own historical and moral world:the one that postulates him from the very beginning as an adult making himselfand who, in his turn, doesn’t replicate and doesn’t carry further (doesn’t“multiply” and doesn’t unfold: structurally, as time, as spaces) but this one.With his own existence as a “parent”, he doesn’t perpetuate, doesn’t reproducebut this one, and it is this one that he “inherits”, too. (In this respect,he only inherits himself, thus asserting and uncovering better his way ofbeing, that what he most properly “has”, as its existence exposes him in moredetail, more openly – while he unfolds it –, and both actuate their potentialities,coming to fruition as a tandem, because, like their world, both their temporalityand their history are one and the same.) This way, his “growing up”,both in (as) the world’s history and in every single one, his becoming-a-subject,that is the manner of self-(pre)supposing he already is, by destinality– and here we are already talking about the effective, singular subject of itsown existence (je meines: “mine, each time”) and of existence as such (theone, at the same time, rather mystified through the original fiction which prescribes,not without some forgery, his insertions in the historical-empiricalorder of the world: by the fact that it not only wanted him to be an adult,but also a total, a completely self-determined, perfectly self-attained one) – isnothing else but the integration, during everyone’s life, of this orphan condition:learning (to be with) it. (For reasons of concision, I simplify, of course,the design of the argument and go straight to the point. For instance, when110
+ (copii abandonafli. pærinfli în abandon)arbitraræ generalizare empiricæ de introspecflie, cu atît mai puflin dubioasæretrospecflie <strong>idea</strong>list-speculativæ. Singularitatea aceasta caracteristicæ este,dimpotrivæ, anume gînditæ aøa, încît sæ dea de înfleles, tocmai, cæ ea nu eexemplaræ decît fiindcæ e pluralæ, multiplicabilæ la nesfîrøit – exact ceea ceconvine „sociabilitæflii“ din societæflile noastre de masæ. De asemenea, se vafi înfleles deja cæ nu practic aici o aproximativæ antropologie istoricæ, ci mælimitez a fixa, în goanæ, însæ cît pot de riguros, niøte repere pe care uniile-ar numi existenflial-istoriale, absolut necesare dacæ e sæ înfruntæm serioschestiunea abandonului sub figura sa eminamente modernæ: de derelicfliuneîntre semeni. 3 )Cæ subiectul modern, pe lîngæ alte „cusururi“ care-i øtirbesc gloria, este orfanla modul radical e, de altfel, chiar una din lecfliile (de existenflæ) cele mai secrete– mai enigmatice øi mai teribile în acelaøi timp (de aici caracterul ei impenetrabil,cîtæ vreme nu e însuøitæ) – pentru orice copil care vine pe lume.El se deschide la viafla personalæ øi interpersonalæ, la memorie øi la viitor,capætæ experienfla tuturor lucrurilor øi a semenilor, crescînd astfel în existenflaproprie – pînæ la punctul inasignabil dinainte dupæ care, ca de la sine, secretulse risipeøte, iar el poate, în fine, sæ înfleleagæ. (Nu spun cæ se øi întîmplæaøa întocmai; ba chiar, cel mai adesea, se gæsesc suficiente, prea suficiente,instanfle „binevoitoare“ – familie, educatori øi pedagogi, bisericæ øi popi, diversefracfliuni de societate, precum øi diverse combinaflii între toate acestea – caresæ-øi fi fæcut o „misie“ din a se græbi deja dinainte sæ punæ „în locul [acela]gol un zeu“ 4 ; un zeu, un idol, un fetiø...) E, în schimb, cunoøtinfla (certitudinea)cea mai intimæ øi mai implacabilæ (cea mai banalæ, într-un sens, chiar øiatunci cînd nu vrem sæ øtim prea bine de ea), pentru oricine care, la punctulde akmé al condifliei adulte (bunæoaræ, cu copiii „plecafli de acasæ“ øi, maiales, cu propriii pærinfli trecufli în nefiinflæ), i-a trecut pragul øi se poate recunoaøteîn învæflætura acestei lecflii. Øi tot de aceea, cu toate cæ existenflanoastræ e chiar locul (pe) unde survine abandonul, cæ ea însæøi e totuna cuabandonul 5 (a-fi-færæ-pærinfli 6 , în sensul cel mai propriu, cæci aceøtia din urmæne nasc pe noi, nu øi existenfla noastræ), atunci cînd vine înainte de vreme– øi cu cît vine mai devreme – secretul brutal sfîøiat al condifliei noastre esenflialmenteorfane este devastator pentru copilul realmente abandonat.Acesta ar fi, aøadar, preflul emancipærii øi al eliberærii. Oricît de inconfortabilar pærea acest bilanfl, el nu poate fi înlæturat; poate da de gîndit (øi trebuies-o facæ), dar soldul lui net e chiar ceea ce ne susfline în existenflæ, dîndu-iacesteia øi forma de epocæ. În cursul ultimelor douæ, trei secole, omenirea– aceea din care pretindem cæ sîntem øi vrem sæ facem parte – a ajuns sænu se øtie identifica decît printr-o asemenea schemæ a emancipærii, cu toateconsecinflele ei. Ea nici nu pare a se dezice de aceastæ autoidentificare,deøi existæ semne cum cæ dinamica emancipærii, supusæ ea însæøi proprieisupradeterminæri accelerate, ajunge adesea sæ-øi centrifugheze chiar sensul,sfîrøind în eliberæri futile (în timp ce devine oarbæ la alte servitufli). Dar,de altfel, ea (omenirea) nici n-a øtiut, pe de altæ parte (øi nici n-a mai „vrut“),sæ-øi inventeze o altæ cale a eliberærii umanului din om, dimpreunæ cuceea ce „naøte“ propriu-zis øi prolifereazæ din acesta; nu o progenituræ(„umanitæflile“, spre deosebire de indivizi øi de neamuri (genos) ori triburi(ethnos), nu pogoaræ natural, continuu unele din altele), ci, înainte de toate,o subiectivitate: aceea constînd în exacerbarea, intensificarea øi, de fapt,desævîrøirea – pînæ la extremitatea sa narcisicæ, chiar autistæ, în orice caz vidatæde trimiteri tranzitive spre altceva decît ea însæøi – a felului „egotic“ de a fiI speak of the singularity of existence that each/any of us is – moreover, revealingan historic path which condenses in itself a long epoch emergence –, thisis neither solipsism, nor an arbitrary empirical generalization starting fromintrospection, and certainly not a dubious <strong>idea</strong>list speculative retrospection.On the contrary, this characteristic singularity is purposely meant to say that itis exemplary just because is plural, endlessly multipliable – exactly what isconvenient for the “sociability” of our mass societies. Also, one could alreadyunderstand that what I practice here is definitely not a historical anthropology;I resume myself at setting, although on the run, but as strictly as possible,several landmarks which someone would call existential and histori(c)al[geschichtlich], absolutely necessary if we want to confront seriously the issueof abandonment under its pre-eminently modern form: as dereliction betweenfellow humans, between neighbours. 3 )The fact that modern subject, besides other “flaws” which undermine itsglory, is radically orphan, is anyway one of the most secret (existence) lessons– most enigmatic and most terrible at the same time (whence its impenetrablenature, as long as it’s not appropriated) – for every child coming intoworld. He opens himself to personal and interpersonal life, to memory andfuture, gains experience of all things and fellow humans, thus growing in hisown existence – up to the point, indiscernible before it happens, when thesecret vanishes, seemingly all by itself, and finally he may indeed understand.(I’m not saying that’s exactly how it happens; on the contrary, most often,there are sufficient, all too sufficient “benevolent” instances – family, educators,teachers, church and priests, various fractions of the society, as well asvarious combinations of them all – who commission themselves with the“task” of “placing a god in [that] void place” 4 ; a god, an idol, a fetish...)It is, however, the most intimate and implacable (and, in a sense, the mostcommon) knowledge (rather a certainty, even when we don’t want so much toacknowledge it) for everyone who, at the akmé point of adulthood (for instance,with “runaway” children and, especially, with one’s own parents gone),crossed this threshold and may recognize himself in the teaching of thatlesson. And, for the same reason, although our existence is the very placewhere(from) abandonment arrives, although it is in itself one and the samewith being-forsaken 5 (to-be-without-parents 6 , in the most literally sense,because the latter beget us, not our existence), when it comes too soon – andthe sooner it comes – the secret, brutally ripped, of our essentially orphancondition is (literally) devastating for the child who is really abandoned.So this seems to be the price to be paid for emancipation and liberation.Uncomfortable as it may seem, this accountance cannot be left apart; it maygive one to think (and it has to do so), but its final balance is just what supportus in existence, also shaping it as an epoch. For the last two or three centuries,mankind – the one we claim and aspire to be a part of – cannot identifyitself anymore but through such an emancipation scheme, with all its dueconsequences. It doesn’t even seem to deny this self-identification, althoughthere are signs that the dynamics of emancipation, itself subjected to its ownaccelerate over-determination centrifugates its very sense, ending as futileliberations (while turning a blind eye on other servitudes). But, however,on the other hand, it (mankind) didn’t (didn’t “want” to) invent another wayto free the human [nature] from man along with that what he really “begets”:not an offspring (“humanities”, unlike individuals and kin (genos) or tribes(ethnos) –, do not stem, naturally, continuously one from another), but, beforeall, a subjectivity: the one consisting in exacerbating, intensifying and, in fact,completing – to its narcissistic, even autistic extremity, anyway devoid of ref-111
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wartæ + societate / arts + society
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Aspirafliile celor care ar vrea sæ
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+ (copii abandonafli. 109 Cînd aba
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arhivaJulie Ault øi Martin Beck s
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arhivatate care contestau radical s
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arhivaÎn acest punct se ridicæ c
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arhivaevenimente care au avut ca re
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arhivadurabilitæflii materialului
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arhivarezistenflei culturale øi so
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arhivasucces considerabil în ce pr
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arhivaWesleyan University Press/Uni
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10.01.2006-27.03.200610.01.2006-27.
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Am vorbit la telefon cu Jaw. Se va
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Blow Up. Îmi place la nebunie cum
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Tom SandqvistØtefan Constantinescu
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Øtefan ConstantinescuTom Sandqvist
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Cristi PogæceanModernist Bird Hous
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story, the essence that is. The cul
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O discuflie cu Ion GrigorescuHans U
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imagini sînt foarte aproape de oam
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- Page 72 and 73: Lia PerjovschiTimelineMarcel Ducham
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- Page 78 and 79: 76Ján MančuškaRepeated Interior,
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împotriva cærora nici bogæflia,
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Oraø al paniciiPaul Virilio„Atun
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lor. E o torturæ „civilæ“, ca
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s-o cîøtigæm. Acum, aceastæ lup