Rapid Assessment for Resilient Recovery and ... - GFDRR
Rapid Assessment for Resilient Recovery and ... - GFDRR
Rapid Assessment for Resilient Recovery and ... - GFDRR
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all in<strong>for</strong>mal <strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong>mal leaders/groups, the structure of aid distribution was clearer <strong>and</strong> the<br />
distribution timely. In one of the communities visited, the sub-district leaders organized<br />
daily meetings to review the support to be provided <strong>and</strong> distribution plans. In less organized<br />
sites with weaker community structures the research team noted a greater potential <strong>for</strong><br />
conflict to emerge among community sub-groups <strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong> gaps in the provision of relief to<br />
emerge. In some areas, Kamnan 168 or sub-district heads <strong>for</strong>med specific groups to provide<br />
support <strong>for</strong> areas that did not receive assistance from elected representatives of the<br />
Sub-district Administrative Organization. Existing community networks <strong>and</strong> structures,<br />
there<strong>for</strong>e, have significant potential (primarily in rural areas) to support longer-term<br />
recovery ef<strong>for</strong>ts.<br />
The social fabric was found to be more fragile in urban areas with a limited number of<br />
community associations <strong>and</strong> infrequent interactions between communities <strong>and</strong> local<br />
leaders. Instances of collaborative behavior were also less prevalent. These characteristics<br />
of urban settings have tended to make the distribution of aid less effective. Urban<br />
groups, especially low income groups, were often unable to participate much in relief<br />
ef<strong>for</strong>ts. They rely mainly on community leaders to identify sources of support. In the<br />
visited areas, the assessment team found that the responsibility <strong>for</strong> identifying sources<br />
of aid tended to rest with two or three people with established personal connections with<br />
municipalities or other sources of external support. This is likely to generate difficulties in<br />
the equitable distribution of relief assistance. The absence of community networks further<br />
impacts the distribution of aid with greater potential <strong>for</strong> particular sub-groups to be excluded.<br />
In some areas, the research team heard reports of complaints over the distribution of food<br />
<strong>and</strong> relief goods survival kits.<br />
Potential sources of tension within communities were also noted. The perceived mismanagement<br />
of water resources by local communities has already resulted in some degree of<br />
tension between communities <strong>and</strong> local government representatives. In particular, conflicts<br />
arose about the timing <strong>for</strong> opening <strong>and</strong> closing of flood gates in a number of areas. In the<br />
sites visited during the SIA in the Central Plains, no particular tensions have emerged as<br />
yet. This is partly due to the fact that there were no significant disparities in the degree to<br />
which different sub-groups have been affected or in the support that has been provided so<br />
far. In the area where the SIA field test took place in Prachinburi, however, there appeared<br />
to be potential <strong>for</strong> escalating tension <strong>and</strong> conflict. In these sites, in particular, the irrigation/<br />
water management department is seen as favoring particular groups <strong>and</strong> areas at the<br />
expense of others. The perception being that while water levels are kept high in some<br />
areas, other communities are better protected with their homes <strong>and</strong> field remaining<br />
relatively dry. As the recovery process gets underway, this situation will need to be<br />
monitored very closely to avoid exacerbating existing tensions.<br />
In addition, farmers reported concerns with the implementation of recovery programs by<br />
government once the emergency response phase is over. Farmers raised concerns about<br />
the implementation of previous programs by line agencies. They considered in<strong>for</strong>mation<br />
168 The Minister of Interior is responsible <strong>for</strong> appointing provincial governors, who per<strong>for</strong>m their duties as representatives<br />
of the central administration at the provincial level <strong>and</strong> have an oversight function over local authorities. Provincial governors<br />
are supported in this process by district officer or kamnan. The district officer is the top civil servant position within the<br />
district, with all staff in the local administration answerable to her/him. Additionally, the district officer exercises significant<br />
de facto control <strong>and</strong> oversight over the administration of TAOs or sub-districts which lie within her/his jurisdiction, irrespective<br />
of the fact TAOs have independent elected councils <strong>and</strong> executives.<br />
THAI FLOOD 2011 RAPID ASSESSMENT FOR RESILIENT RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION PLANNING<br />
225