Abstracts (PDF file, 1.8MB) - Society for Risk Analysis
Abstracts (PDF file, 1.8MB) - Society for Risk Analysis
Abstracts (PDF file, 1.8MB) - Society for Risk Analysis
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SRA 2013 Annual Meeting <strong>Abstracts</strong><br />
T3-E.3 Lander, DR; Heard, NE; Dellarco, M*; DuPont,<br />
Syngenta, NIH; dellarcom@mail.nih.gov<br />
Product Stewardship <strong>for</strong> a New Product: RISK 21 Tiered<br />
Exposure Framework in Practice<br />
This presentation demonstrates how the RISK21 tiered<br />
exposure framework can be applied <strong>for</strong> product stewardship or<br />
regulatory compliance through a hypothetical case study.<br />
RISK21 uses a tiered framework <strong>for</strong> refining the exposure and<br />
hazard estimate independently based on which will have the<br />
biggest reduction in uncertainty. The hypothetical problem<br />
<strong>for</strong>mulation <strong>for</strong> this case study was: your company is developing<br />
a mosquito bed netting containing a pyrethroid to prevent<br />
transmission of West Nile Virus <strong>for</strong> use at children outdoor<br />
summer camps in the United States. The company has product<br />
stewardship requirements to verify there is no unwarranted<br />
risk to workers making the product and consumers using the<br />
product. The marketing department is ready to sell the product<br />
but is waiting <strong>for</strong> the completed risk assessment. As the RISK21<br />
framework is applied, the decisions made by the risk assessor<br />
are discussed. The Tier 0 approach used the worker and<br />
consumer banding methods as well as the Environmental<br />
Background Database approach. The Tier 0 risk assessment<br />
matrix indicated further refinement was needed in both<br />
exposure and toxicity estimates. For a deterministic Tier 1<br />
exposure assessment more in<strong>for</strong>mation on the use was needed.<br />
The World Health Organization’s 2004 document “A Generic<br />
<strong>Risk</strong> Assessment Model <strong>for</strong> Insecticide Treatment and<br />
Subsequent Use of Mosquito Nets” was used to in<strong>for</strong>m on the<br />
mosquito net use. With further exposure refining inside Tier 1,<br />
a risk assessment matrix was developed showing minimal risk<br />
from use. If confidence was not high enough, Tier 2 could be<br />
used to ascertain the probabilities of the risk to further in<strong>for</strong>m.<br />
Finally, since deltamethrin is an insecticide used <strong>for</strong> other uses<br />
there could be concern <strong>for</strong> cumulative exposures. Tier 3 looked<br />
at NHANES biomonitoring data to compare current human<br />
pyrethroid background exposure to the new use to verify no<br />
concern from cumulative uses.<br />
T2-J.2 Landis, WG*; Johns, A; Western Washington University;<br />
wayne.landis@wwu.edu<br />
<strong>Analysis</strong> of the exposure-effects relationships from<br />
concentration-response curves <strong>for</strong> ecological risk<br />
assessment<br />
Recently there has been an intense discussion regarding the<br />
proper analysis tools <strong>for</strong> the description of the<br />
exposure-response relationship <strong>for</strong> environmental risk<br />
assessment. We have developed an alternative analysis that<br />
relies on curve fitting but that generates a distribution around a<br />
selected ECx value where x is the boundary of the unacceptable<br />
effect size. We have explored a variety of exposure-response<br />
datasets from two laboratories and with a diverse group of<br />
chemicals. The DRC package in the R programming<br />
environment was used to calculate the regression and the 95<br />
percent confidence intervals. At concentrations at and<br />
surrounding what would be estimated as a 20 percent effect a<br />
distribution was derived to capture the likelihood of different<br />
levels of effects. A triangle distribution was created via Monte<br />
Carlo technique with the mode the point corresponding the<br />
estimated exposure-response and the upper and lower limits<br />
corresponding to the range of the confidence interval. <strong>Analysis</strong><br />
of a variety of exposure-response curves illustrated the<br />
importance of the slope of the curve and the breadth of the<br />
confidence interval. For example, the concentrations of<br />
parathion corresponding to an EC20 value <strong>for</strong> immobilization of<br />
Daphnia magna was bounded by effects levels from 8 to 42<br />
percent. The description of the EC value becomes a distribution<br />
bounded by the upper and lower bounds of the effect axis, the<br />
upper and lower bounds along the concentration axis and the<br />
likelihood of each exposure and effect combination. This kind of<br />
probabilistic in<strong>for</strong>mation is not available from point estimations<br />
from conventional hypothesis testing or reliance on the<br />
determination of a point ECx. We present several examples to<br />
demonstrate the critical nature of having the<br />
exposure-response curve, its confidence bounds and the<br />
exposure-effects distribution in estimating risk.<br />
T1-H.4 Lathrop, JF; Innovative Decisions, Inc.;<br />
jlathrop@innovativedecisions.com<br />
Applying Concepts of Quality of Position to Terrorism<br />
<strong>Risk</strong> Management<br />
Last year at this conference, I presented the concept of Quality<br />
of Position as a decision guiding metric <strong>for</strong> terrorism risk<br />
management. The underlying logic is that Probabilistic <strong>Risk</strong><br />
Assessment (PRA) is a powerful tool <strong>for</strong> organizing and<br />
processing attack-scenario in<strong>for</strong>mation <strong>for</strong> terrorism risk<br />
assessment, but it is intrinsically limited to assessing risks that<br />
can be characterized by anticipated scenarios. The problem is<br />
that in terrorism risk management, an important part of the<br />
risk space is comprised of unanticipated scenarios, i.e., “Black<br />
Swans,” especially since some terrorists (“Reds”) are smart<br />
enough to deliberately design attacks “not on Blue’s list” (that<br />
would appear, to Blue, as Black Swans), and so not addressed<br />
well (if at all) by PRA. So last year I suggested the concept of<br />
“Quality of Position” (QOP), a multiattribute utility (MAU)<br />
metric capturing how well Blue is positioned in the “game”<br />
against Red, with attributes including a PRA metric and also<br />
broader concepts of resilience, leverage, deterrence and<br />
disincentivization. The concept of QOP is lifted from guidance<br />
<strong>for</strong> chess players, who are faced with a similar (but importantly<br />
different) problem of playing a game where it is beyond their<br />
capability to predict how all possible futures may unfold. This<br />
paper takes those concepts and fleshes them out with actual<br />
MAU attribute scales, and mathematical demonstrations of how<br />
a QOP metric can advise terrorism risk management in ways<br />
superior to PRA alone. Developing QOP concepts brings along<br />
with it the development of broader concepts of how analysis<br />
can guide terrorism risk management. The most important of<br />
those is to lift the role of analysis from guiding essentially<br />
tactical decisions, such as allocating detectors among target<br />
cities, to more strategic decisions, i.e., to playing the game at a<br />
more strategic level than simply defending a large number of<br />
(but not all) targets. The paper will conclude with<br />
recommendations <strong>for</strong> implementation.<br />
M3-A.1 Lathrop, JF; Innovative Decisions, Inc.;<br />
jlathrop@innovativedecisions.com<br />
Applying terrorism risk management concepts to enhance<br />
ISO 31000 risk management<br />
We take big steps when we step from widely accepted risk<br />
management, such as specified in ISO 31000, to broader risk<br />
management concepts in<strong>for</strong>med by other fields. This talk will<br />
briefly synthesize risk management concepts from terrorism<br />
risk management, and other new thinking, with the classic risk<br />
management concepts specified in ISO 31000. We have learned<br />
from our work in terrorism risk assessment/management that in<br />
many arenas we need to orient our thinking around managing<br />
risk that specifically addresses unanticipated scenarios. <strong>Risk</strong><br />
management can be improved by taking advantage of three key<br />
concepts we’ve developed in our terrorism risk management<br />
work: robustness, resilience and quality of position. Then we<br />
examine new concepts provided to us from Nassim “Black<br />
Swan” Taleb in the latest book he has inflicted upon us,<br />
Antifragile, and develop concepts in<strong>for</strong>med by combining his<br />
latest work with our terrorism work. This paper will combine<br />
concepts from both of those areas into recommendations <strong>for</strong> an<br />
additional set of principles of risk management, to be added to<br />
the considerable set of principles, already widely accepted, in<br />
ISO 31000.<br />
December 8-11, 2013 - Baltimore, MD