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Abstracts (PDF file, 1.8MB) - Society for Risk Analysis

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SRA 2013 Annual Meeting <strong>Abstracts</strong><br />

T3-E.3 Lander, DR; Heard, NE; Dellarco, M*; DuPont,<br />

Syngenta, NIH; dellarcom@mail.nih.gov<br />

Product Stewardship <strong>for</strong> a New Product: RISK 21 Tiered<br />

Exposure Framework in Practice<br />

This presentation demonstrates how the RISK21 tiered<br />

exposure framework can be applied <strong>for</strong> product stewardship or<br />

regulatory compliance through a hypothetical case study.<br />

RISK21 uses a tiered framework <strong>for</strong> refining the exposure and<br />

hazard estimate independently based on which will have the<br />

biggest reduction in uncertainty. The hypothetical problem<br />

<strong>for</strong>mulation <strong>for</strong> this case study was: your company is developing<br />

a mosquito bed netting containing a pyrethroid to prevent<br />

transmission of West Nile Virus <strong>for</strong> use at children outdoor<br />

summer camps in the United States. The company has product<br />

stewardship requirements to verify there is no unwarranted<br />

risk to workers making the product and consumers using the<br />

product. The marketing department is ready to sell the product<br />

but is waiting <strong>for</strong> the completed risk assessment. As the RISK21<br />

framework is applied, the decisions made by the risk assessor<br />

are discussed. The Tier 0 approach used the worker and<br />

consumer banding methods as well as the Environmental<br />

Background Database approach. The Tier 0 risk assessment<br />

matrix indicated further refinement was needed in both<br />

exposure and toxicity estimates. For a deterministic Tier 1<br />

exposure assessment more in<strong>for</strong>mation on the use was needed.<br />

The World Health Organization’s 2004 document “A Generic<br />

<strong>Risk</strong> Assessment Model <strong>for</strong> Insecticide Treatment and<br />

Subsequent Use of Mosquito Nets” was used to in<strong>for</strong>m on the<br />

mosquito net use. With further exposure refining inside Tier 1,<br />

a risk assessment matrix was developed showing minimal risk<br />

from use. If confidence was not high enough, Tier 2 could be<br />

used to ascertain the probabilities of the risk to further in<strong>for</strong>m.<br />

Finally, since deltamethrin is an insecticide used <strong>for</strong> other uses<br />

there could be concern <strong>for</strong> cumulative exposures. Tier 3 looked<br />

at NHANES biomonitoring data to compare current human<br />

pyrethroid background exposure to the new use to verify no<br />

concern from cumulative uses.<br />

T2-J.2 Landis, WG*; Johns, A; Western Washington University;<br />

wayne.landis@wwu.edu<br />

<strong>Analysis</strong> of the exposure-effects relationships from<br />

concentration-response curves <strong>for</strong> ecological risk<br />

assessment<br />

Recently there has been an intense discussion regarding the<br />

proper analysis tools <strong>for</strong> the description of the<br />

exposure-response relationship <strong>for</strong> environmental risk<br />

assessment. We have developed an alternative analysis that<br />

relies on curve fitting but that generates a distribution around a<br />

selected ECx value where x is the boundary of the unacceptable<br />

effect size. We have explored a variety of exposure-response<br />

datasets from two laboratories and with a diverse group of<br />

chemicals. The DRC package in the R programming<br />

environment was used to calculate the regression and the 95<br />

percent confidence intervals. At concentrations at and<br />

surrounding what would be estimated as a 20 percent effect a<br />

distribution was derived to capture the likelihood of different<br />

levels of effects. A triangle distribution was created via Monte<br />

Carlo technique with the mode the point corresponding the<br />

estimated exposure-response and the upper and lower limits<br />

corresponding to the range of the confidence interval. <strong>Analysis</strong><br />

of a variety of exposure-response curves illustrated the<br />

importance of the slope of the curve and the breadth of the<br />

confidence interval. For example, the concentrations of<br />

parathion corresponding to an EC20 value <strong>for</strong> immobilization of<br />

Daphnia magna was bounded by effects levels from 8 to 42<br />

percent. The description of the EC value becomes a distribution<br />

bounded by the upper and lower bounds of the effect axis, the<br />

upper and lower bounds along the concentration axis and the<br />

likelihood of each exposure and effect combination. This kind of<br />

probabilistic in<strong>for</strong>mation is not available from point estimations<br />

from conventional hypothesis testing or reliance on the<br />

determination of a point ECx. We present several examples to<br />

demonstrate the critical nature of having the<br />

exposure-response curve, its confidence bounds and the<br />

exposure-effects distribution in estimating risk.<br />

T1-H.4 Lathrop, JF; Innovative Decisions, Inc.;<br />

jlathrop@innovativedecisions.com<br />

Applying Concepts of Quality of Position to Terrorism<br />

<strong>Risk</strong> Management<br />

Last year at this conference, I presented the concept of Quality<br />

of Position as a decision guiding metric <strong>for</strong> terrorism risk<br />

management. The underlying logic is that Probabilistic <strong>Risk</strong><br />

Assessment (PRA) is a powerful tool <strong>for</strong> organizing and<br />

processing attack-scenario in<strong>for</strong>mation <strong>for</strong> terrorism risk<br />

assessment, but it is intrinsically limited to assessing risks that<br />

can be characterized by anticipated scenarios. The problem is<br />

that in terrorism risk management, an important part of the<br />

risk space is comprised of unanticipated scenarios, i.e., “Black<br />

Swans,” especially since some terrorists (“Reds”) are smart<br />

enough to deliberately design attacks “not on Blue’s list” (that<br />

would appear, to Blue, as Black Swans), and so not addressed<br />

well (if at all) by PRA. So last year I suggested the concept of<br />

“Quality of Position” (QOP), a multiattribute utility (MAU)<br />

metric capturing how well Blue is positioned in the “game”<br />

against Red, with attributes including a PRA metric and also<br />

broader concepts of resilience, leverage, deterrence and<br />

disincentivization. The concept of QOP is lifted from guidance<br />

<strong>for</strong> chess players, who are faced with a similar (but importantly<br />

different) problem of playing a game where it is beyond their<br />

capability to predict how all possible futures may unfold. This<br />

paper takes those concepts and fleshes them out with actual<br />

MAU attribute scales, and mathematical demonstrations of how<br />

a QOP metric can advise terrorism risk management in ways<br />

superior to PRA alone. Developing QOP concepts brings along<br />

with it the development of broader concepts of how analysis<br />

can guide terrorism risk management. The most important of<br />

those is to lift the role of analysis from guiding essentially<br />

tactical decisions, such as allocating detectors among target<br />

cities, to more strategic decisions, i.e., to playing the game at a<br />

more strategic level than simply defending a large number of<br />

(but not all) targets. The paper will conclude with<br />

recommendations <strong>for</strong> implementation.<br />

M3-A.1 Lathrop, JF; Innovative Decisions, Inc.;<br />

jlathrop@innovativedecisions.com<br />

Applying terrorism risk management concepts to enhance<br />

ISO 31000 risk management<br />

We take big steps when we step from widely accepted risk<br />

management, such as specified in ISO 31000, to broader risk<br />

management concepts in<strong>for</strong>med by other fields. This talk will<br />

briefly synthesize risk management concepts from terrorism<br />

risk management, and other new thinking, with the classic risk<br />

management concepts specified in ISO 31000. We have learned<br />

from our work in terrorism risk assessment/management that in<br />

many arenas we need to orient our thinking around managing<br />

risk that specifically addresses unanticipated scenarios. <strong>Risk</strong><br />

management can be improved by taking advantage of three key<br />

concepts we’ve developed in our terrorism risk management<br />

work: robustness, resilience and quality of position. Then we<br />

examine new concepts provided to us from Nassim “Black<br />

Swan” Taleb in the latest book he has inflicted upon us,<br />

Antifragile, and develop concepts in<strong>for</strong>med by combining his<br />

latest work with our terrorism work. This paper will combine<br />

concepts from both of those areas into recommendations <strong>for</strong> an<br />

additional set of principles of risk management, to be added to<br />

the considerable set of principles, already widely accepted, in<br />

ISO 31000.<br />

December 8-11, 2013 - Baltimore, MD

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