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hegemon” (Habermas 2003a, 706). Han
skriver i en helt central passage:
“Empirical objections to the possibility of
realizing the American vision converge in the
thesis that global society has become far too
complex; the world is no longer accessible
to a centralized control, through politics
backed up by military power … Politics
loses its primacy over the horizontally
networked media of both markets and
of communication once it attempts to
regress to the original, Hobbesian form of
a hierarchical security system” (Habermas
2003a, 706)
Verden er for kompleks til traditionel politik
(Habermas 2002b, 167). USA har ikke lært
den (europæiske) lektie og repræsenterer
derfor en farlig ”hegemonisk unilateralisme”,
der står i modsætning til det, Europa endnu
ikke er men skal stræbe efter at blive: en
verdensindenrigspolitisk magt, der ”også
udadtil bliver handlekraftig og beviser, at det
ikke kun er antallet af militære enheder, der
tæller i et komplekst verdenssamfund, men
også forhandlingsdagsordeners, politiske
forbindelsers og økonomiske fordeles
bløde magt” (Habermas 2003b, 9). Den nye
globale kompleksitet reducerer nytten af
den hårde magt og opprioriterer nytten af
den bløde magt:
“… there is a blurring of the boundaries
between domestic and foreign policy that
are constitutive of state sovereignty. The
classical image of power politics is being
changed not only by additional normative
features such as a politics of democratisation
or of human rights, but also through a
peculiar diffusion of power itself. With the
E r f r e m t i d e n e u r o p æ i s k ?
growing pressure for cooperation, more or
less indirect influence is becoming more
important than direct implementation of
one’s own goals through the exercise of
administrative power or threats of violence.
Instead, power is now exerted indirectly in
the structuring of perceived situations, in
the creation of contacts, in the interruption
of flows of communication, or in the
definition of agendas and problems; in short,
it is exercised on the boundary conditions
within which actors make their decisions.
‘Soft power’ forces ‘hard power’ aside and
robs the subjects Kant had counted on in
his association of free states of the very
basis for their independence.” (Habermas
1997, 122-123)
I de globale strømme bliver statsmagten,
mere og mere irrelevant, fordi den bliver
mere og mere magtesløs. ”Strømmens magt
overvinder magtens strøm”, som Manuel
Castells udtrykker det (Castells 2000c,
500). USA står stædigt fast ved magtens
strøm og udtrykker derfor en modsætning
til det, Europa ser som den givne og
gældende fremtid. Denne insisteren på
klassisk territorialmagt er farlig og forældet.
Castells giver en generel karakteristik af
nationalstatens fremtid: ”nation-states
survive beyond historical inertia because of
the defensive communalism of nations and
people in their territories, hanging onto
their last refuge not to be pulled away by the
whirlwind of global flows” (Castells 1997,
308, min fremhævning).
Europas kritik af USA er (også)
bestemt af de forskellige analyser af verdens
tilstand og udvikling, der sætter Europa som
fremtiden og USA som fortiden.
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