Reframing Latin America: A Cultural Theory Reading ... - BGSU Blogs

identity construct #3: gender 129
tion between male and female sex roles is treated as a distinction between
“instrumental” and “expressive” roles in the family considered as a small
group. Thus gender is deduced from a general sociological law of the differentiation
of functions in social groups [. . .].
When Pleck in 1981 published a comprehensive re-examination of the
male role literature, The Myth of Masculinity, this relation between role
and self was central. He criticized the “Male Sex Role Identity” paradigm
(his name for functionalist sex role theory) above all for its assumption of
concordance between norm and personality—the idea that conformity to
sex role norms is what promotes psychological adjustment.
This criticism was highly effective. Pleck demonstrated how much is
taken for granted by functionalist sex role discourse, and how little empirical
support there is for its key ideas. Even more interesting, Pleck offered
an almost Foucaultian argument that the rise of normative sex role theory
was itself a form of gender politics. Historical changes in gender relations
required a shift in the form of social control over men, from external to internal
controls [. . .].
This is not to say the dramaturgical metaphor of role is entirely useless
in understanding social situations. It is apt for situations where (a) there are
well-defi ned scripts to perform, (b) there are clear audiences to perform to,
and (c) the stakes are not too high (so it is feasible that some kind of performing
is the main social activity going on). None of these conditions, as a rule,
applies to gender relations. “Sex role” is basically an inappropriate metaphor
for gender interactions. (One can, of course, think of specifi c situations
in gender interaction where roles are defi nitely played. Ballroom dancing
competitions spring to mind—as in the charming fi lm Strictly Ballroom.)
In sex role theory, action (the role enactment) is linked to a structure
defi ned by biological difference; the dichotomy of male and female—not to
a structure defi ned by social relations. This leads to categoricalism, the reduction
of gender to two homogenous categories, betrayed by the persistent
blurring of sex differences with sex roles. Sex roles are defi ned as reciprocal;
polarization is a necessary part of the concept. This leads to a misperception
of social reality, exaggerating differences between men and women,
while obscuring the structures of race, class and sexuality. It is telling that
discussions of “the male sex role” have mostly ignored gay men and have
had little to say about race and ethnicity [. . .].
The Social Organization of Masculinity [. . .]
“Masculinity” is not a coherent object about which a generalizing science
can be produced. Yet we can have coherent knowledge about the issues raised