Report - Agence canadienne d'évaluation environnementale
Report - Agence canadienne d'évaluation environnementale
Report - Agence canadienne d'évaluation environnementale
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
Assessing the risks related to the project<br />
In his analysis, the proponent took into account incidents which could lead to LNG spills<br />
during the transit of LNG tankers. To that end, the consequences of accident scenarios<br />
deemed to be most likely were considered. According to the analysis, the ship’s outer hull<br />
would not be breached in the case of a grounding, and even less so for the inner hull, in<br />
view of river’s sandy bed and the security margin ensured through the proper design and<br />
manufacture of the ship hulls and tanks. LNG tankers could therefore face the vagaries of<br />
the tides without impact on the inside tanks (Mr. Glenn Kelly, DT3, p. 26 and 27).<br />
A study was conducted in this respect by the Bureau Veritas to assess the resistance<br />
of ship structures and the integrity of cargo containment systems when dealing with<br />
tides having an amplitude of 6 m. The study concluded that the cases of grounding<br />
studied pointed to a significant security margin with respect to the risk of major<br />
damage to the structure or damages done to the cargo containment system, including<br />
for several tidal cycles (DA13). Moreover, in the event of a spill resulting from this type<br />
of accident, then the probability of spontaneous combustion was estimated at<br />
10 percent by the proponent, as the breach would occur underwater.<br />
According to the proponent, only an accident occurring close to the terminal could<br />
result in a cloud of gas that could spread over a great distance and reach an area of<br />
medium population density. In the event of a collision occurring in the seaway, the<br />
probability of instantaneous combustion was estimated at 90 percent, as a major<br />
collision would generate sufficient force to create sparks.<br />
Both the proponent and Transport Canada agreed that certain conditions would be required<br />
to actually breach the inner tank. These include a speed of eight knots or more for a ship of<br />
50,000 t or more, at 90 o on the side of the LNG tanker (Mr. Glenn Kelly, DT6, p. 86).<br />
In this respect, the Panel notes that the Sandia National Laboratories report also<br />
specified that these same conditions would have to be brought together to breach the<br />
inner hull of an LNG tanker (Sandia, 2004, p. 100 1 ).<br />
Furthermore, the proponent estimated at 50 percent the probability of a delayed cloud<br />
ignition in an inhabited area after a collision or grounding.<br />
During the hearing, many participants expressed doubts regarding LNG tankers ability<br />
to safely navigate the St. Lawrence River. Several participants were concerned that<br />
an LNG tanker could become grounded in the Traverse du Nord or even in front of île<br />
d’Orléans. In this respect, the proponent stated that “even in the worst grounding case<br />
scenario, there are techniques which, firstly, allow the ships to float free and secondly,<br />
let other ships safely pass by” (Mr. Glenn Kelly, DT6, p. 85).<br />
1. Op. cit.<br />
132 Rabaska Project – Implementation of an LNG Terminal and Related Infrastructure