Report - Agence canadienne d'évaluation environnementale
Report - Agence canadienne d'évaluation environnementale
Report - Agence canadienne d'évaluation environnementale
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Assessing the risks related to the project<br />
Closer to home, the terminal of Canaport in New Brunswick uses a 595-m radius<br />
around the LNG tanks. However, contrary to the current project which plans on using<br />
full containment tanks, the tanks of that terminal are single wall. The terminals in<br />
Freeport and Cameron in the United States have exclusion radiuses of 279 and<br />
283 m respectively around their full containment tanks (DA12, p. S11-4).<br />
Furthermore, the MDDEP was of the opinion that the proponent’s analysis of the<br />
exclusion zones was acceptable and in compliance with the CSA-Z276 standard<br />
(DQ61.1, p. 2). It also recalled that it could recommend, if required, additional security<br />
measures beyond those planned by the proponent, should the project be completed.<br />
♦ Finding — The Panel found that there are other facilities in the world of the same<br />
nature as those of the project, whose exclusion zones are of the same magnitude as<br />
those proposed in the project.<br />
The accident scenarios used and their consequences<br />
The proponent assessed the possible consequences from a collision between a ship<br />
and an LNG tanker located at the jetty. He retained four main scenarios for his land<br />
facilities. They included fires resulting from an LNG leak out of the largest ESD 1<br />
segment (PR3.3.2, F-1, p. 47); from tank lines; from the unloading line; and from a<br />
tank roof. The pipeline was the subject of a separate analysis<br />
The consequences of a collision between a ship and a berthed LNG<br />
tanker<br />
To assess the consequences stemming from the most likely accident scenarios for a<br />
collision between a ship and an LNG tanker at the jetty, the proponent used breaches<br />
of 250 mm, 750 mm and of 1,500 mm. The distances to the 5-kW/m 2 thermal radiation<br />
limit, as well as the dispersion distances, were the same as those provided in Table 7.<br />
Table 9 shows the number of residences in the Lévis-Beaumont sector which could<br />
possibly be included in the 5-kW/m 2 impact area, should these accident scenarios<br />
ever occur.<br />
1. ESD Segment: Emergency Shutdown System.<br />
Rabaska Project – Implementation of an LNG Terminal and Related Infrastructure 147