Report - Agence canadienne d'évaluation environnementale

On-land risks
Assessing the risks related to the project
In this section, the Panel traces the history of accidents at LNG land facilities,
examines the security measures planned by the proponent and analyzes the
consequences of accident scenarios produced for the terminal and pipeline.
History of accidents at liquefied natural gas land facilities
As is the case with LNG maritime transport sector, the safety record regarding
accidents at LNG land facilities (terminals on land, tanks, regasification equipment,
etc.) was described as outstanding by a great number of specialists. Thus, Susan
Tierney 1 underscored the absence of major accidents at land facilities of LNG
terminals in the United States during the past 25 years. According to her, there are
currently close to 200 LNG storage and peak-shaving facilities throughout the world,
113 of which are in the United States, including the Gaz Métro facilities which have
been in operation in Montreal-East since 1969 2 .
The proponent presented a detailed history of accidents related to the processing,
storing and transporting of LNG, drawn from various databases. The only accident
that affected a population occurred in 1944, in Cleveland, in the United States, and
was attributed to the use of inadequate materials in the design and building of the
tanks used at the time. More recently, the Skikda accident which occurred in Algeria
took place in a liquefaction plant and was deemed to have been caused by an
explosion in a boiler. In this respect, the proponent stressed the fact that the project
does not involve any liquefaction operations or the use of boilers.
Security measures for land facilities
The proponent plans to integrate security measures in the design, construction and
operation of the LNG terminal. Thus, the LNG tanks would be built according to a “full
containment” approach, and erected in individual impoundment basins. Impoundment
systems would also be set up according to the CSA Z276-01 Canadian standard, and
the NFPA-59A-01 US standard. The unloading lines between the wharf and the site
would be underground and encased in a concrete caisson with a nitrogen inert
atmosphere.
1. Susan F. Tierney, Report to the Massachusetts Special Commission Relative to Liquefied Natural Gas Facility
Siting and Use [On-line: www.mass.gov/legis/reports/Tierney_Report_to_MA_LNG_Commission_6-30-06_FINAL.pdf].
2. Gaz Québec, vol. 14, n° 1, 2006, p. 5.
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