Report - Agence canadienne d'évaluation environnementale

Assessing the risks related to the project
In his opinion, there would be no school, hospital or public assembly places within this
isocontour (DQ99.1, p. 1).
According to the proponent, a fire at the pipeline could spread towards the terminal’s
facilities, in the event of a leak igniting close to the terminal’s connection point. Yet the
facility which would be the closest to the pipeline is the metering station. The distance
between this station and the pig launching station would be approximately 120 m.
Only a major leak or a pipeline rupture could have an impact on this metering station
or other equipment nearby. According to the proponent, the probability of a pipeline
accident spreading towards the metering station was less than 10 -5 per annum. This
probability was even lower for other terminal facilities located further away. As for the
tanks, a pipeline accident could not reach them given the distance separating the
pipeline from the tanks. According to the proponent, should a leak occur in the
pipeline close to the terminal’s connection point, it would be detected and isolated
very quickly (the block valve at the terminal connection would be equipped with an
automatic shutoff mechanism activated by a pressure drop). This would reduce the
potential for damages to the terminal’s facilities. Lastly, terminal operators would
intervene quickly and use the terminal’s stationary or mobile firefighting equipment to
protect the terminal’s equipment if necessary (DQ17.3).
♦ Finding — The Panel found that, in the event of a pipeline rupture, individuals could be
located inside an impact area lying between the 5 and 37.5 kW/m 2 thermal radiation
limits. However, in light of the history of accidents associated with pipelines in
Canada, the Panel estimate the probability of such an accident occurring to be low.
156 Rabaska Project – Implementation of an LNG Terminal and Related Infrastructure