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Report - Agence canadienne d'évaluation environnementale

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Assessing the risks related to the project<br />

Regarding the worst-case scenario stemming from an intentional act, the 5-kW/m 2<br />

isocontour would extend to the shore at cap Gribane, at cap Brûlé and to the south<br />

shore east of île d’Orléans. However, there are no dwellings or other sensitive<br />

community facilities in these sites within the 5-kW/m 2 isocontour. For the maximum<br />

scenario in the event of accidents, the 5-kW/m 2 isocontour would never reach the<br />

shore. Moreover, the proponent also specified that the distance between an LNG<br />

tanker and île-aux-Coudres would be approximately 1.5 km on average, of more than<br />

11 km for île-aux-Grues, and of more than 500 m from île d’Orléans (PR5.3.2, p. 3;<br />

PR5.1, p. 3.117 and Figures A-42 to A-46).<br />

Table 8 details a summary of the sensitive elements which would be located within<br />

the 5-kW/m 2 limit of impact area in the sectors of the east point of île d’Orléans, of<br />

Saint-Laurent-de-L’Île-d’Orléans and of Lévis-Beaumont. These elements are also<br />

illustrated in Figure 8.<br />

The proponent identified the sensitive elements in the built environment located within<br />

the 1.6-kW/m 2 thermal radiation threshold. His analysis considered a scenario with a<br />

breach of 750 mm, representing a distance of 780 m for this radiation level. According<br />

to this assessment, these were the places where the 1.6-kW/m 2 isocontour would<br />

make land and where the sensitive elements are: the east point of île d’Orléans, the<br />

sector of Saint-Laurent-de-L’Île-d’Orléans and the south shore to the right of the jetty<br />

(DQ99.1, p. 4 and 5). These sensitive elements are identified in Figure 8. The<br />

distance for the accident scenario with a breach of 1,500 mm for a 5-kW/m 2 thermal<br />

radiation limit would be approximately 820 m for the Qflex type LNG tanker. The<br />

Panel was satisfied with this inventory, but it believes it appropriate that the proponent<br />

complete the inventory of these elements by taking into account a 3-kW/m 2 thermal<br />

radiation limit for a scenario involving a breach of 1,500 mm and a steady-state spill<br />

pool fire, so that this information could be made available when planning emergency<br />

measures.<br />

138 Rabaska Project – Implementation of an LNG Terminal and Related Infrastructure

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