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THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

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Hegel claims that the differences between various kinds of objects, both<br />

“inorganic” and “living,” can be determined with regards to these various “modes of this<br />

unity.” Thus the notion, as the concrete unity or as the unity of identity and difference,<br />

presents basic structural features common to all objects, to those that are organic as well<br />

as those that are inorganic. Different kinds of things – such as physical beings, chemical<br />

beings, organic beings, humans as anthropological beings, humans as political beings,<br />

etc. – present different modes of unity, and it is this difference in the mode of unity that<br />

allows us to characterize the distinctions that constitute each kind.<br />

In this passage, Hegel states the basic problem of the unity of identity and<br />

difference – or the unity of unity and plurality – in terms of the problem of the<br />

constitution of physical and/or chemical objects. He presents the basic problem in terms<br />

of the physicist, “who is…aware that he has before him a variety of sensuous properties<br />

and matters—or usually matters alone (for the properties get transformed into matters<br />

also for the physicist)—and that these matters (elements) also stand in relation to one<br />

another.” Here we have three basic moments that present themselves in our conception<br />

of a physical and/or chemical object. First, we have a “variety” of properties or matters.<br />

Hegel says that the properties all to often get transformed into matters. Properties have a<br />

dependent status. Properties present a plurality of features that all “belong to” or are<br />

“grounded in” some unified thing. When we treat properties as matters, we treat them as<br />

independent things. Rather than treating the thing as a unity (substance) that includes<br />

plurality (properties), we treat it as a collection that consists in a plurality of independent<br />

things. Second, in addition to the variety of properties we have some relation between<br />

them. This is the moment of unity, for as Hegel says, “relation ipso facto implies unity.”<br />

95

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