THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

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from the elements that comprise it and the manifold life outside it, and that (2) the individual is one with the elements that comprise it and the manifold life outside it. This account of the individual presents the same basic “contradiction” or paradox that we have already seen in the structure of judgment. In his discussion of judgment, Hegel says both that the subject is the predicate and that the subject is not the predicate. While on the one hand, the sense in which the subject is the predicate and the sense in which it is not the predicate are different, on the other hand these two senses cannot be fully disambiguated. In his mature philosophy, Hegel argues that reason or speculation can resolve the nature of this apparent contradiction, that it can grasp the essential relation between the two moments presented in judgment or the individual. In the Systemfragment, however, he presents religion as the sole means by which this contradiction or paradox can be resolved. 248 In this early work, Hegel’s position thus proves to be quite similar to that of Jacobi. Like Jacobi, he sees the individual and the organic process of life as a paradoxical or inexplicable conjunction of two disparate elements – of unity and plurality, of synthesis and analysis, of connection and distinction, etc. And, like Jacobi, he sees the resolution of this problem as something that transcends the power of human reason – i.e. the power of philosophy. contradiction that consist in the following claims: (a) in one sense A is B; (b) in another sense, A is not B; and (c) the sense in which A is B and the sense in which as is not B cannot be fully disambiguated. 248 In the Systemfragment, Hegel says: “Philosophy must end with [or in] religion.” He goes on to describe the merely negative task of philosophy in the following terms: “it [philosophy] has the task of indicating the finitude in all that is finite and through reason to demand the full explanation of the finite.” Through this, “philosophy establishes the true infinite as outside of its domain.” Hegel continues: “the raising of the finite to the infinite can be characterized as the raising of finite life to the infinite, as religion” (Werke 1, pp. 422-3). 237
In the Systemfragment Hegel also describes mind in terms that point back towards Jacobi and forward towards his own conception of the central problem of philosophy, towards the unity of identity and difference. In a rather complex passage, Hegel makes the following claim about the nature of mind: Mind is the living unity of plurality in opposition to the same plurality in the shape which forms the plurality found in the concept of life, not in opposition to the plurality as divided from life, as dead, as mere plurality. 249 Among other things, this passage explains the relationship between mind and life. The terms of this explanation closely resemble the form/matter relation in Aristotle. Form unites matter. So in this sense, form and matter can be characterized in terms of the relation between unity and plurality, as Jacobi points out. Moreover, for Aristotle, the form of one level serves as the matter for a higher level. So form and matter are relative terms. In this passage, Hegel explains the relationship between life and mind in a similar way. He describes life as the unity of “dead” or “mere” plurality. 250 So relative to that which is lifeless, life presents a unity. 251 Relative to mind, however, life presents a plurality. Mind takes the plurality provided by life and synthesizes it into higher forms of unity. As with the development of life, we can only assume that mind presents a force of division as well as of unity – i.e. that it both articulates through an act of differentiation and unites through an essentially related act of synthesis. 249 Werke 1, p. 421. 250 In fact, at least in his later work, life unites pluralities that are already themselves unities. Various forces constitute the unity of matter qua matter as well as the unity of various kinds of matter. Life then takes these various kinds of matter and forms them into a higher unity. See Section 2.4 of Chapter Two. 251 Of course life doesn’t just present a force of unification. As Hegel specifically insists in this essay, it also presents a force of distinction. So life doesn’t simply unite lifeless matter. It also articulates or distinguishes such matter. 238
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THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENC
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Michael Eugene Morris in terms of c
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1.1) Preliminary Remarks………
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7) Essay on Natural Right: The Unit
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interpret these issues as an expres
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even “naively metaphysical.” 4
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immanent metaphysics. Insofar as He
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consciousness.” 13 Thus the Scien
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all genuine objects consist in some
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This section does not explain the m
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transitions from abstract right to
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The second moment of the will is th
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self as “pure infinity,” thus d
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will and the third part of the book
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3.2) The Notion: Substance as Subje
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is movement towards a “purpose.
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Therefore he argues we must replace
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judgment of the plant. The illustra
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the Encyclopedia, Hegel describes t
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colorful - but ultimately justified
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constituted in terms of the same ba
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provides the basic categories in te
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3.5) The “I” as Instantiation o
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of the self are genuine moments rat
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moments of the will. With regard to
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Before examining these issues, we s
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the third moment of the will, the m
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1.1) Preliminary Remarks CHAPTER TW
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certain traditional conceptions of
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conception that considers a thing a
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thing is “nothing.” Thus Bradle
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crucial ways. 71 Moreover, we are n
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From this brief survey, the followi
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If we can think of the thing’s qu
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and concrete, each object strives t
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different ways as his philosophy pr
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insists that truth comes in degrees
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necessary, therefore, if we use the
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Hegel believes that truth and falsi
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Hegel even insists that physical an
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2.4) The Degrees of Truth Ascribed
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more developed form of unity. A spe
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instantiated. The tree has thousand
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proximate truth of that from which
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higher kinds. The most general univ
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the solution. The next highest kind
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In the most general and abstract te
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The unity of identity and differenc
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of identity and difference, reason
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evident in the processes of life. M
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In accordance with the interpretati
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Third, we have the moment that unit
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category of ontology helps to make
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CHAPTER THREE THE NATURE OF GENUINE
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Our discussion of these phenomena s
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Two will briefly consider Hegel sol
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2.2) Difference, Identity, and Unit
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The second and third moments distin
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The moments of identity and differe
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The structure of judgment presents
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is red.” In this judgment, the su
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“identity” and “connection.
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interpretation assumes that “is
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judgments present the most develope
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emains unclear. However, it should
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speculation grasps the unity that u
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that is also a connecting. Thus jud
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Judgment obviously involves two men
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option presents judgment as the res
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5.4) Judgment Considered as a Serie
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we must carefully distinguish betwe
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all into the abyss of vacuity witho
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divides and articulates that which,
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5.5) Judgment Considered as a Serie
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as (b) a process that starts with u
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The essential requirement for the s
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Through this progress [which is als
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inhere in this substance. Thus we c
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conversely, the understanding const
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1) Introduction CHAPTER FOUR THE NA
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consider judgment as a series of ac
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Each judgment contains two obvious
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then there would be no basis for di
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In order to grasp the structure of
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In order to grasp the structure of
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corresponds to the way the object i
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contradicts it, this is to be recog
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make between different features of
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Here Hegel considers a conception o
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determining the exact nature of the
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moment of analysis. Moreover, we sa
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conception of the substance as subj
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says: “Only this self-restoring s
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elation to the unity that constitut
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instantiate their telos fully. Or,
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inextricably entwined with its othe
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Page 221 and 222: 5.8) No Discrete Plurality Given Pr
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Page 235 and 236: 3) Jacobi: The Mysterious Unity of
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The standpoint of civil society see
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Civil society also rests upon the d
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can be defined in terms of some bio
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different from others. The desire t
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civil society. 330 The final senten
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point even more forcefully in his d
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Hegel’s view, the contradictions
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which the individual participates,
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argument, and on the basis of this
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HEGEL'S WORKS BIBLIOGRAPHY Werke. F
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Fulda, Hans Friedrich. (1978) “He
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Neuhouser, Frederick. (2000) Founda
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