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THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

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anything mediated, since that which is mediated already presupposes thought. So if<br />

thought has a beginning, that beginning must be immediate. As Hegel, says, only<br />

“immediacy” can serve as a “beginning proper.”<br />

Shortly after this passage, Hegel goes on to argue that nothing is free of<br />

mediation. He says:<br />

There is nothing, nothing in heaven or in nature or in mind or anywhere else<br />

which does not equally contain both immediacy and mediation, so that these two<br />

determinations reveal themselves to be unseparated and inseparable and the<br />

opposition between them to be a nullity. But as regards the philosophical<br />

discussion of this, it is to be found in every logical proposition in which occur the<br />

determinations of immediacy and mediation and consequently also the discussion<br />

of their opposition and their truth. 151<br />

Hegel claims there is nothing immediate. Or to put the point somewhat differently, as it<br />

is stated in the discussion of pure being, the wholly immediate or undifferentiated proves<br />

to be indistinguishable from nothing. It is, in other words, nothing. In the discussion of<br />

pure being, Hegel demonstrates that there is nothing without determination. Hegel also<br />

says that the nature of the essential relation between immediacy and mediation can be<br />

seen in the structure of the “logical proposition” – i.e. the judgment. As our discussion of<br />

judgment demonstrated, every judgment presupposes (a) an implicit conception of the<br />

whole as immediate; as well as (b) the dual process of mediation that occurs in analysis<br />

and synthesis.<br />

So Hegel argues that there is nothing immediate, nothing outside of thought with<br />

which thought might begin. From this he argues that thought has an explicitly<br />

hermeneutic or circular structure. Hegel says:<br />

151 Science of Logic, p. 68.<br />

143

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