THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

So each stage of the dialectic includes three moments. The first moment
articulates some fundamental distinction; the second moment uncovers the contradictions
that arise from the original and rigidly oppositional conception of the distinction; and the
third moment indicates some resolution of these contradictions, a resolution that requires
us to grasp the deeper unity that underlies the original distinction. Most interpreters who
construe the dialectic as a transcendental argument more or less ignore the role played by
contradictions in the development of the Philosophy of Right. Of course nothing
precludes us from coming up with some non-standard conception of transcendental
arguments, one that somehow uncovers contradictions in the process of determining
necessary conditions. However, at this point, the language of transcendental arguments
becomes more misleading than helpful. Moreover, once we admit the role of
contradictions in the dialectic, the claim that the Philosophy of Right merely augments or
grounds the values of traditional liberalism becomes less tenable.
5) The Transition from “Morality” to “Sittlichkeit:” A Concrete Example of the
Dialectic
Philosophers such as Neuhouser, Pippin, and Westphal might admit the claims
made in the preceding discussion and yet still defend their interpretation of the
Philosophy of Right. They might argue that Hegel’s general remarks about his method do
not apply to the dialectic as employed in the Philosophy of Right. Hegel seems to employ
different dialectical approaches in his various works, and thus, they might argue, it would
be foolish to assume that he possesses a single, unified dialectical method. Moreover,
contradictions seem to play a much smaller role in the Philosophy of Right than they do
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