THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

term “apparent change” does not designate those cases (a) where some thing appears to
change but actually remains the same. Instead, it designates those cases where (b) some
thing appears to change but is actually annihilated and then replaced by some other newly
created thing. For my present purposes, it is irrelevant whether or not annihilation and
creation should be considered changes. For my argument it is only important that (1) the
distinction I have drawn between genuine change and apparent change captures some real
conceptual difference, and that (2) what I have designated as genuine change actually
occurs. In light of these assumptions, I will argue that in order to explain the distinction
between genuine change and apparent change, we must explain the structure of change
in terms of the unity of identity and difference.
Genuine change requires three moments – moments that respectively emphasize
difference, identity, and unity. The first moment of genuine change can be described as
the moment of difference. All change requires some difference between the state of
things before the change and the state of things after the change. Without this difference,
there is no change, only a constant or unchanging state. Both genuine and apparent
change require this moment. Apparent change consists in annihilation and creation.
Annihilation presupposes a difference between the state of things before the annihilation
and the state of things after it. The same holds for creation. Thus the moment of
difference characterizes both genuine and apparent change.
diversity that explains change] must involve a multitude in the unity or in the simple” (Monadology,
paragraph 13). Leibniz goes on to explain the spatial metaphor of containment in terms of perception. He
claims: “The passing state which involves and represents a multitude in the unity or in the simple substance
is nothing other than what one calls perception” (Monadology, paragraph 14). Thus in order to explain
natural change, we must grasp the relationship between something that persists and something that changes.
This is the relationship between identity and difference, between unity and plurality. Leibniz argues that
the plurality involved in the change exists in the unity that persists through the change, and he further
explains this containment relationship in terms of the structure of perception.
107