THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

thing is “nothing.” Thus Bradley argues that we should not construe the copula as an
expression of conjunction or mere togetherness, and he concludes that we must search for
some third meaning of the copula. This third meaning must (1) explain the genuine unity
of the properties in the object, as the second conception of the copula fails to do, and it
must (2) do so in a manner that does not simply reduce the properties to identity, as the
first conception of the copula does.
Bradley states the basic problem posed by the meaning of the copula and the
structure of the object in terms that are closely related to the Hegelian phrase, the unity of
identity and difference. Bradley says:
While the diversities are external to each other and to their union, ultimate
satisfaction is impossible. There must, as we have seen, be an identity and in that
identity a ground of distinction and connection. 68
Here Bradley speaks of an identity that includes distinction and connection. The copula
presents this identity. The copula expresses the relation or unity between the distinctions
or various features of the object, on the one hand, and the connection or unity of these
features, on the other hand. Moreover, this unity is not some higher relation added to the
distinction and the connection, but rather it is the fundamental basis that grounds the
distinction and the connection. Thus Bradley designates the structure of the copula and
the object with the phrase, “the identity of distinction and connection.” Hegel designates
the same structure with the phrase, “the unity of identity and difference.”
Following Hegel and Leibniz, Bradley argues that certain mental phenomena –
specifically action and representation – provide a model for conceiving the structure of
68 Appearance and Reality, p. 507.
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