05.10.2013 Views

THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

self-understanding in determining her responsibility for an action (“Morality”). On<br />

Pippin’s view, the institutions and commitments presented in Sittlichkeit do not supercede<br />

Hegel’s resolute commitment to basic rights and moral agency. Pippin justifies this claim<br />

in terms of his interpretation of the dialectical structure of the Philosophy of Right. He<br />

says:<br />

The general purpose of Hegel’s practical philosophy is to describe the conditions<br />

for the possibility of being a free subject, or of “agency,” and the results of that<br />

account are: (i) be a “person” and respect others as “persons” (don’t violate<br />

another’s rights; respect legitimate claims of non-interference, above all with<br />

respect to property); (ii) be a “subject”; or be morally responsible for what you do<br />

and regard others, all other human beings, as morally responsible beings; (iii) be<br />

an ethical being, affirm and sustain certain ethical institutions. Or in conventional<br />

language: act legally, act morally, act ethically; respect rights, do what is morally<br />

obligatory and what is ethically good. 295<br />

Like Westphal, Pippin sees “being a free subject” or “agency” as the central theme of<br />

Hegel’s political philosophy. On his view, the three main sections of the Philosophy of<br />

Right present three distinct but equally essential “conditions for the possibility” of self-<br />

determination or agency. Pippin’s presentation of the dialectic, as a kind of<br />

transcendental argument, emphasizes the complete legitimacy of the earlier dialectical<br />

stages, the stages in which Hegel discusses themes and concepts central to liberalism.<br />

This conception of the dialectic thereby provides the basis for his defense of Hegel’s<br />

political philosophy against charges of anti-individualism.<br />

Fredrick Neuhouser agrees with Westphal and Pippin about the basic<br />

argumentative structure of the Philosophy of Right, though his account is more complex<br />

and nuanced. Although Neuhouser does not specifically classify Hegel as a liberal, he<br />

does claim that Hegel’s political philosophy seeks to “integrate liberalism’s concerns for<br />

295 Neue Heft für Philosophie, p. 97<br />

271

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!