THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

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themselves. In other words, it does not describe some process by which the mind first “creates” space, time, and the external world by “projecting” its sensations out of itself. Here Hegel’s language seems somewhat misleading, particularly his use of the word “hinauswerfen” – or as it is translated here, “projection” – to describe the process by which sensations receive a spatial and temporal structure. However, Hegel is not describing the creation of space and time from out of the subject, but rather he is describing the acts by which the mind first becomes aware of the structure of space and time, the acts through which space and time first come to exist for the mind. In its relation to the world, the mind is always active. It does not passively receive anything from the world. More dramatically, Hegel claims that it is not causally affected by the world. 200 In awareness, perception, and cognition, the mind “reaches out” 200 Hegel makes this point repeatedly throughout his discussion of psychology. For instance, he says: “Only soul [the object of anthropology] is passive, but free mind is essentially active, productive” (Philosophy of Mind, paragraph 444Z). And: “A host of other phrases used of intelligence, e.g. that it receives and accepts impressions from outside, that ideas arise through the causal operations of external things upon it, etc., belong to a point of view utterly alien to the mental level or the position of philosophical study” (Philosophy of Mind, paragraph 445). These passages raise two absolutely crucial questions. First, what does it mean to say that the mind is essentially active and productive, that it is never passive? Here there are two options. First, we might interpret this as the claim that the mind or subject creates the world, and that the apparently external world is just a projection of the mind. Second, we might interpret this claim as an expression of the way that the mind is intentionally directed at the world, as an attempt to take seriously the claim that the mind “reaches out to the world.” Hegel says that the mind does not receive “impressions from outside, and that ideas do not arise “from the causal operations of external things upon it.” We might interpret these claims in the tradition of Berkeleyan Idealism, as (1) the acceptance of “ideas” in the mind, but as (2) the rejection of the claim that these ideas are caused by external objects. Alternatively, we might interpret these claims as a more wholesale rejection of the socalled way of ideas, as a rejection of an account of perception and knowledge in terms of the possession of ideas that come from, and ideally correspond to, external objects. The general line of interpretation presented in this dissertation clearly endorses the second interpretation of these remarks. On this view, perception and cognition consist in the activities by which the mind reaches out and grasps the world. Thus the mind is always active in its relation to the world. The second major interpretive question about this passage involves Hegel’s distinction between the soul and the mind, between anthropology and psychology. Hegel clearly denies that the category of causality applies to the mind. Reasons, not causes, present the principle relational terms that unite mental phenomena. For instance, one belief does not cause another belief, but rather it provides a reason for it. Similarly, my memory of seeing beer in the fridge does not cause my belief that there is beer in the fridge, but rather it provides a reason for that belief. In these terms, the question about the relationship between the soul and the mind, between anthropology and psychology, becomes a question about the relationship between explanations in terms of causality and 205
to the world. This means that the mind does not become aware of the structure of objects through mere passive affectedness. Instead, the mind actively grasps the structure of objects when it recapitulates the same structure through the acts of judgment. In terms more directly relevant to the present discussion, this means that the mind does not passively perceive the structures of space and time. The mind must grasp or recapitulate these structures through its own activity. In one sense, the mind must construct space and time. In order to think space and time, and in order to conceive of objects as spatial and temporal, the mind must articulate the structures of space and time. However, this constructive activity does not create space and time. More generally, Hegel’s remarks about the fundamentally active nature of mind do not express his commitment to some process whereby the mind creates the world of its experience. Instead, such language expresses his commitment to the view that awareness and knowledge involve the active self-directedness of the mind towards the world. Hegel makes this point clearly when he warns against a subjective interpretation of his remarks about space and time. He says: Quote Six: But when we said that what is sensed receives from the intuiting mind the form of the spatial and temporal, this statement must not be understood to mean that space and time are only subjective forms. 201 Space and time exist prior to the acts of attention. These mental acts do not create space and time, though they do articulate these structures, thereby making the structures evident explanations in terms of reasons. Are these two kinds of explanations simply different kinds of explanations of the same domain, or are they descriptions of domains or partial regions that are different? 201 Philosophy of Mind, paragraph 448Z. 206
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THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENC
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Michael Eugene Morris in terms of c
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1.1) Preliminary Remarks………
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7) Essay on Natural Right: The Unit
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interpret these issues as an expres
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even “naively metaphysical.” 4
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immanent metaphysics. Insofar as He
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consciousness.” 13 Thus the Scien
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all genuine objects consist in some
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This section does not explain the m
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transitions from abstract right to
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The second moment of the will is th
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self as “pure infinity,” thus d
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will and the third part of the book
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3.2) The Notion: Substance as Subje
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is movement towards a “purpose.
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Therefore he argues we must replace
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judgment of the plant. The illustra
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the Encyclopedia, Hegel describes t
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colorful - but ultimately justified
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constituted in terms of the same ba
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provides the basic categories in te
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3.5) The “I” as Instantiation o
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of the self are genuine moments rat
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moments of the will. With regard to
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Before examining these issues, we s
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the third moment of the will, the m
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1.1) Preliminary Remarks CHAPTER TW
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certain traditional conceptions of
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conception that considers a thing a
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thing is “nothing.” Thus Bradle
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crucial ways. 71 Moreover, we are n
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From this brief survey, the followi
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If we can think of the thing’s qu
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and concrete, each object strives t
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different ways as his philosophy pr
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insists that truth comes in degrees
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necessary, therefore, if we use the
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Hegel believes that truth and falsi
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Hegel even insists that physical an
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2.4) The Degrees of Truth Ascribed
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more developed form of unity. A spe
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instantiated. The tree has thousand
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proximate truth of that from which
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higher kinds. The most general univ
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the solution. The next highest kind
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In the most general and abstract te
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The unity of identity and differenc
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of identity and difference, reason
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evident in the processes of life. M
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In accordance with the interpretati
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Third, we have the moment that unit
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category of ontology helps to make
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CHAPTER THREE THE NATURE OF GENUINE
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Our discussion of these phenomena s
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Two will briefly consider Hegel sol
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2.2) Difference, Identity, and Unit
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The second and third moments distin
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The moments of identity and differe
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The structure of judgment presents
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is red.” In this judgment, the su
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“identity” and “connection.
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interpretation assumes that “is
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judgments present the most develope
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emains unclear. However, it should
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speculation grasps the unity that u
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that is also a connecting. Thus jud
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Judgment obviously involves two men
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option presents judgment as the res
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5.4) Judgment Considered as a Serie
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we must carefully distinguish betwe
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all into the abyss of vacuity witho
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divides and articulates that which,
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5.5) Judgment Considered as a Serie
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as (b) a process that starts with u
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The essential requirement for the s
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Through this progress [which is als
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inhere in this substance. Thus we c
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conversely, the understanding const
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1) Introduction CHAPTER FOUR THE NA
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Page 163 and 164: Each judgment contains two obvious
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Page 167 and 168: In order to grasp the structure of
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Page 207 and 208: In Quote 2 Hegel argues from the ex
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Page 221 and 222: 5.8) No Discrete Plurality Given Pr
Page 223 and 224: 1) Introduction CHAPTER FIVE THE UN
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Page 229 and 230: In the Darstellung meines Systems d
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Page 235 and 236: 3) Jacobi: The Mysterious Unity of
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Here we see the basic structure of
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see further a connection between th
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issues and the views of his two pre
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difference illuminate, explain, and
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chapters could enrich and further s
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illustrates the alternative concept
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Philosophy of Right. Here we can im
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In an article entitled, “The basi
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the fundamental rights and interest
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ealize the kind of self-determinati
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The hermeneutic process illustrates
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necessary condition for the possibi
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So each stage of the dialectic incl
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In the following passage, Hegel cha
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“Sittlichkeit” presents the uni
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Hegel’s discussion of civil socie
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The standpoint of civil society see
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Civil society also rests upon the d
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can be defined in terms of some bio
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different from others. The desire t
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civil society. 330 The final senten
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point even more forcefully in his d
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Hegel’s view, the contradictions
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which the individual participates,
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argument, and on the basis of this
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HEGEL'S WORKS BIBLIOGRAPHY Werke. F
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Fulda, Hans Friedrich. (1978) “He
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Neuhouser, Frederick. (2000) Founda
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