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THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

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experience in which certain things are presented to us. By contrast, judgment is an active<br />

process, one that we must initiate.<br />

In perception we seem to be immediately aware of various objects, of tables,<br />

chairs, rocks, birds, and trees. This visual experience of the world, and of the<br />

objects in the world, does not seem to rest upon our own cognitive activity. On<br />

this initial impression, perceptual or sensory awareness presents us with various<br />

discrete objects. It seems that awareness of these discrete objects precedes the<br />

acts of judgment, which then synthesize or analyze that which is given to the<br />

mind as discrete. On this initial impression, it seems that experience or the world<br />

presents us with a discrete plurality, not with an undifferentiated manifold.<br />

In contrast to this initial impression, Hegel’s account of judgment rests upon the<br />

crucial claim that judgment does not begin with anything discretely given to it. In this<br />

Appendix, I will not exhaustively defend this claim, for the issues involved are complex.<br />

However, I will consider Hegel’s claim that even the most basic forms of perceptual<br />

awareness involve conceptual content. I will examine this claim within the context of<br />

Hegel’s more general view that all mental phenomena – including emotions and<br />

instinctive urges – already have conceptual structure. I will also consider some of<br />

Hegel’s reasons for these claims. In Section 5.2 I will examine various passages where<br />

Hegel insists that even the most basic levels of perceptual or sensory awareness contain<br />

conceptual structure, and in Sections 5.4 through 5.9 I will examine a kind of argument<br />

for accepting this account of basic perceptual or sensory awareness.<br />

5.2) Textual Support<br />

Throughout his philosophy, Hegel insists that implicit conceptual structure, and<br />

thus also implicit conceptual activity, permeates all aspects or modes of our mental life.<br />

Conceptual activity structures our most basic sentient awareness and emotional<br />

affectedness. The following passages from various texts present Hegel’s commitment to<br />

190

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