THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

moment, actually precedes and structures the first two moments. The meaning of the first
two moments thus rests upon the third moment, the moment that expresses their unity.
On the surface, there is nothing mysterious about the claim that in one sense the
object is many, and that in another sense it is one. This claim presents – to return to a
previous quote from Taylor – “simply our old problem of quality and substance, [of] how
the many states can belong to one thing.” 167 The object is a substance (unity) that has
many different properties (plurality). This seems familiar, relatively straightforward, and
unproblematic. However, the term “has” remains unclear. Its meaning remains
undetermined. In other words, the relation between the substance and its properties
remains unclear. The sense in which these properties “inhere in” or are “grounded in” the
substance remains vague. 168
Not only does the course of our previous argument suggest that that this relation
remains vague, it also suggests that this vague or indeterminate relation serves as the
basis for determining the meaning of both “substance” and “property.” In order to grasp
the sense in which the thing is one and the sense in which it is many, we must grasp the
sense in which these two senses are senses of the same thing. This third sense – the sense
that expresses the unity of unity and plurality – grounds or structures the first two senses.
In the claim that the object is a substance that has many different properties, the word
“has” expresses this third sense, the sense that provides the ultimate but largely implicit
basis upon which we understand the terms “substance,” and “property.”
167 Elements of Metaphysics, p. 161.
168 Of course it is to solve this very problem that Leibniz explains the inclusion of the plurality in
the monad in terms of perception. Perception provides a model of how plurality may be contained in unity,
and thus it provides an account of what it means to say that various properties ‘inhere in” or are “grounded
in” the substance. As we will see, Hegel proposes a similar solution.
161