THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

2.2) Difference, Identity, and Unity: Three Necessary Conditions for the Distinction
between Genuine and Apparent Change
With regards to the phenomena of change, the problem of the unity of identity and
difference arises when we seek to distinguish cases where some thing changes from cases
where one thing is annihilated and another thing is created. In the first case, there is
some thing that actually undergoes a change. In the second case, one thing ceases to exist
and another thing begins to exist. Here there is no thing that changes. In order for a
thing to change, it must have different properties, or exist in different ways, at different
times. In the second case, the thing that ceases to exist does not change, for after it
ceases to exist, it does not have any properties or exist in any way. Thus ceasing to exist
is not a change that the thing undergoes. Similarly, in an act of creation, the thing created
does not undergo a change. Before a thing is created, it does not have any properties or
exist in any way. Therefore, in being created, a thing does not undergo a change of
properties or states.
Perhaps it would be mere sophistry to insist that where no thing changes, nothing
changes, though I must confess that the claim seems compelling to me. In any case, for
my present purposes I will simply stipulate that genuine change only occurs where there
is some thing that undergoes the change. I will designate all cases, where there is a thing
that undergoes change, with the term “genuine change.” By contrast, I will use the term
“apparent change” to designate cases of annihilation followed by creation. 109 Here the
109 Leibniz uses the term “natural change” to designate what I am calling genuine change. He
distinguishes natural change from annihilation and creation. He says: “natural change is produced by
degrees (Monadology, paragraph 13). Thus, he says, in natural change, “something changes and something
remains.” From this claim, Leibniz concludes that monads must be simple substances that contain plurality
within them. The simple substance remains the same, but its properties change. Here Leibniz explains the
relationship between the unity of the thing that remains and the plurality of that which changes in terms of
the metaphor of containment. The plurality is contained within the unity. He says: “This diversity [the
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