THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

higher kinds. The most general universal or telos that each object strives to instantiate is
the telos or universal that determines it as a thing or object.
Thus we can rank things in a number of different ways. We can rank particular
individual chimpanzees in relation to the telos that determines them all as chimpanzees.
Similarly, we can rank different kinds of monkeys – including chimpanzees – with
regards to how fully they instantiate the telos that determines them all as monkeys. We
can rank different kinds of mammals – including monkeys – in terms of how fully they
instantiate the telos that makes them all mammals; we can rank different animals –
including mammals – in terms of how fully they instantiate the telos that makes them all
animals; and finally, we can rank all things – including minerals, plants, animals, humans
as social and rational beings, and states – in terms of the general telos that makes them all
objects.
Three things should be noted about the universal-particular or genus-species
relation that structures this general scheme. First, terms like particular and universal have
relative meanings. In relation to the universal that constitutes mammals as mammals, the
term “monkey” designates a particular, though in relation to the particular kinds of
monkeys, including the chimpanzee, the term “monkey” designates a universal. Second,
the relation between the universal and the particular, or between the genus and the
species, is always normative or teleological. The particular always strives to instantiate
the universal, and different particulars have greater and lesser degrees of success in this
endeavor. Third, the universal cannot be adequately characterized without reference to
the particular. The particular presents one manner of achieving the universal. This
manner of achieving the universal fleshes out or particularizes the universal. From this it
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