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THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

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The following passages summarizes many of the points made thus far about the<br />

parallel structures in the distinctions between the infinite and the finite, between the<br />

indeterminate and the determinate, and between identity and difference. It states Hegel’s<br />

claim that reflection fails to grasp the relation or unity of these moments, his claim that<br />

reflection leads to contradiction or antinomy, and his claim that only a proper conception<br />

of the relation between identity and difference can resolve these contradictions or<br />

antinomies. Hegel says:<br />

Such products of reflection include infinity and finitude, indeterminacy and<br />

determinacy, etc. From infinity there is no transition to the finite, and from<br />

indeterminacy there is no transition to the determinate. The transition, as a<br />

synthesis, becomes an antinomy. 259<br />

Shortly thereafter, he continues:<br />

If an ideal opposition is the work of reflection, which completely abstracts from<br />

absolute identity, it is equally true in contrast to this that a real opposition is the<br />

work of reason, which determines [setzt] identity and difference [Nicht-Identität]<br />

as identical, not only in the form of knowledge, but also in the form of being. 260<br />

Reason grasps the identity of identity and difference as the basic structure of knowledge<br />

and of being. In doing so, it grasps the ultimate means of overcoming the contradictions,<br />

paradoxes, or antinomies that arise from the distinctions between infinity and finitude,<br />

between indeterminacy and determinacy.<br />

If the “I” can be fully abstracted from its different representations, then either (a)<br />

the “I” must itself be a representation or a part of a representation, or (b) it must be a<br />

substance that exists beyond our experience – i.e. a substance that cannot be represented.<br />

transcendent substance and the immanent plurality of experience, this doesn’t necessarily show that such a<br />

relation is impossible in itself.<br />

259 Werke 2, p. 98.<br />

260 Werke 2, p. 98.<br />

246

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