THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

Hegel rejects both alternatives, and thus he concludes that the “I” cannot be fully
abstracted from its different representations. This means that the “I” itself presents the
unity of identity and difference. In order to grasp the “I” we must grasp the sense in
which the “I” is the same “I” in all of its representations, and we must, at the same time,
grasp the sense in which the “I” is different in its essential relation to each of the
particular representations it has. 261
In this sense, the “I” has the same structure as the absolute, a structure that Hegel
describes as follows: “But the absolute itself is therefore the identity of identity and
difference; opposition and unity are, at the same time, in it.” 262 Yet again we see the key
words, “at the same time” or “zugleich.” The absolute includes both opposition and
unity, both identity and difference. In order to avoid contradictions, we must grasp these
261 This basic point about the structure of the “I” can be seen in Hegel’s discussion of “Sense-
Certainty,” in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel says: “Among the countless differences cropping up
here we find in every case that the crucial one is that, in sense-certainty, pure being at once splits up into
what we have called the two ‘Thises’, one ‘This’ as ‘I’, and the other ‘This’ as object. When we reflect on
this difference, we find that neither one nor the other is only immediately present in sense-certainty, but
each is at the same time mediated: I have this certainty through something else, viz. the thing; and it
similarly, is in sense-certainty through something else, viz. through the ‘I’” (p. 59). Hegel goes on to
explain this complex point in terms of the structure of the “here” and the “now.” Both the here and the now
have a complex structure. On the one hand, the terms “here” and “now” always refer to something that is
the same. Qua now, or in its nowness, each now is the same. However, the content of each now is
different. Moreover, as Hegel argues here, the relation between the identity and the difference in the now is
mediated, which is to say these two aspects are essentially related, and this essential relation constitutes the
two aspects related. In other words, we can’t make sense of a now without some content. Now it must be
night or day. Or, here there must be a tree or a house. At the same time, we can’t make sense of the
content without thinking of its relation to the now. We can’t think day or night without thinking of the
possibility of their existing – i.e. of their being now. Similarly, we can’t conceive the tree or the house
without the possibility of their being here. Hegel demonstrates these two essentially related aspects by
showing how the meaning of the terms “now” and “here” vacillate between expressing that which is always
the same – the now in its nowness and the here in its hereness – and expressing that which is always
different – night and day, tree and house. In order to grasp the basic structure of the “here” or the “now,”
we must grasp it as the unity or mediation of these two aspects. As expressed in the passage quoted above,
the structure of the here and the now present simple examples of the relation between the “I” and its object.
The “I” is the form of the now and the here. The “I” is basic nowness of the now and the hereness of the
here. However, in the same way that the here and the now only exist in relation to the specific and
changing content that exists here and now, so also the “I” only exists in relation to the object that provides
the content for its form.
262 Werke, 2. P. 97.
247