THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

“plurality,” clearly demonstrates the influence of Schelling upon Hegel. At the same
time, as I argue in Section Two, there are a number of important differences between the
positions of Schelling and Hegel, differences that can be seen as early as 1801. Section
Three will examine a few key passages from Jacobi’s work, Über das Unternehmen des
Kritizismus, die Vernunft zu Verstande zu bringen. 215 In these passages, Jacobi identifies
the relationship between unity and plurality – or synthesis and analysis – as the central
problem or mystery of philosophy. 216 In Glauben und Wissen, Hegel discusses Jacobi’s
essay, and he specifically focuses on the passages that address the relationship between
unity and plurality. This brief examination of selected passages from Jacobi’s essay thus
provides historical precedent for Hegel’s emphasis on the problem of identity and
difference. In Sections Four through Seven, I will examine crucial variations of the
phrase, “the unity of identity and difference,” as they appear in the “Systemfragment von
1800” (Section 4), the Differenzschrift (Section 5), Glauben und Wissen (Section 6), and
Hegel’s essay on natural right (Section 7). Various passages from these earlier essays
should demonstrate the centrality and the flexibility of the problematic of the unity of
identity and difference.
215 In this work, Jacobi criticizes what he sees as Kant’s attempt to explain reason in terms of the
understanding, to explain the unconditioned in terms of the conditioned. Jacobi holds that we can only
grasp the conditioned in light of the unconditioned, the understanding in terms of reason. Moreover, he
argues that the converse is not possible. In other words, we cannot conceive the unconditioned in terms of
the conditioned, nor can we conceive reason in terms of the understanding. This point also proves central
in Hegel’s philosophy, though Hegel does not agree with the conclusion that Jacobi draws from it. Jacobi
concludes that since we cannot conceive the unconditioned in terms of the conditioned, we cannot conceive
the unconditioned. It remains, on his view, a mystery. Hegel, by contrast, believes that speculation or
reason allows us to grasp the unconditioned.
216 We’ve already seen how Hegel sometimes states the problem of the unity of identity and
difference in terms of (a) the problem of the unity of connection and distinction, and (b) the problem of the
unity of synthesis and analysis. In this chapter, we will also see how he states the problem in terms of the
unity of the one and the many, or the unity of unity and plurality. These particular statements of the
problem help to connect Hegel’s discussion with the terms employed by Jacobi.
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