THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

provides the basic categories in terms of which we must grasp the structure of the notion.
It also presents, along with the will, the highest instantiation of the notion. 52
Hegel makes a third important claim in “The Notion in General.” He claims that
Kant fails to recognize the import of his own discovery. Kant assumes that the structures
or activities of apperception are unique to thought. In contrast to this, Hegel argues that
the structures of apperception occur in all genuine objects, though most objects present
these structures in less developed forms. A few pages after the previous passage, Hegel
presents his conception of the notion as a structure that occurs in all genuine objects. He
says:
Similarly, here, too, [in the Science of Logic] the Notion is to be regarded not as
the act of the self-conscious understanding, not as the subjective understanding,
but as the Notion in its own absolute character which constitutes a stage of nature
as well as of spirit. Life, or organic nature, is the stage of nature at which the
Notion emerges, but as blind, as unaware of itself and unthinking; the Notion that
is self-conscious and thinks pertains solely to spirit. But the logical form of the
Notion is independent of its non-spiritual, and also of its spiritual, shapes. 53
The activities and structures presented in apperception present the most developed form
of the notion. However, the same basic structures can be found outside of conscious
thought, in the structures of organic nature. Despite what Hegel says here, these
52 Hegel argues that the same structure characterizes the self in its theoretical and its practical
activities. Thought and volition are not two distinct capacities, functions, or faculties. The cognitive and
volitional structures of the self are the same. In other words, Hegel’s discussion of the “I,” or
transcendental apperception, and his discussion of the will are two discussions of the same basic thing or
process, though one occurs in a theoretical context while the other occurs in a practical context. Hegel
makes this point about the unity of the cognitive and volitional self in the Philosophy of Right. He says:
“The following points should be noted about the connexion between the will and thought. Mind is in
principle thinking, and man is distinguished from beast in virtue of thinking. But it must not be imagined
that man is half thought and half will, and that he keeps thought in one pocket and will in another, for this
would be a foolish idea. The distinction between thought and will is only that between the theoretical
attitude and the practical. These, however, are surely not two faculties; the will is rather a special way of
thinking, thinking translating itself into existence, thinking as the urge to give itself existence” (Paragraph
4A).
53 Science of Logic, p. 586.
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