THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

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third moment, the moment that grasps the unity of identity and difference, or, as Hegel puts it here, the moment that grasps identity and difference at the same time. Before establishing the necessity of this third moment, we should note the many similarities between the previous discussions of time and judgement and the present discussion of the “I = I.” The discussion of the “I = I” presents one example of the more general phenomena of change. As my representations change, I also have an awareness of my self as that which persists or remains the same through these changes. Thus, as with genuine change, we have the identity of that which persists and the difference of that which changes. As I’ve suggested throughout this dissertation, Hegel ultimately argues that all genuine objects – and thus all genuine change – must be understood in terms of the model of the “I = I.” Or: apperception provides the basic model for conceiving the substance as subject (Chapter One, Section 3.4, and Chapter Two Section 1.2). Similarly, there is an intimate relationship between the previous discussion of judgment and the present discussion of the “I = I.” The “I = I” or the “I is I” presents the most basic form of judgment, a form that involves both the connection and the distinction between the subject and the predicate terms. 254 Moreover, the “I = I” presents the telos of all judgments. In this matter, Hegel follows Kant, claiming that the forms of judgment 254 Robert Brandom makes a similar claim in his discussion of Hegel in Tales of the Mighty Dead. Brandom presents what he calls “the idealist thesis” as the claim “that the structure and unity of the concept is the same as the structure and unity of the self” (p. 210). There are, however, two significant differences between Brandom’s view and the one presented here. First, Brandom emphasizes recognition as the key feature of the unity of the self, and he sees these recognitive, inter-subjective acts of constitution as the key to understanding Hegel’s theory of concepts. Brandom sees this kind of inter-subjectivity as means for determining the normativity and semantic content of various concepts. However, Brandom does not focus on the particular forms of judgment as various ways of conceiving the concept (or the notion) as the unity of identity and difference. In other words, he does not focus on the problem of the unity of identity and difference as it occurs in judgment and in the self. Second, Brandom construes concepts in terms of the processes by which we grasp the world. I agree with him on this point. However, in this dissertation I’ve also defended the further claim that concepts (or notions) present the processes by which objects constitute themselves. For a further discussion of Brandom’s understanding of “concept,” one that specifically emphasizes the nature of concepts as processes, see “Sketch of a Program for a Critical Reading of Hegel. Comparing Empirical and Logical Concepts,” in International Yearbook of German Idealism, vol. 3. 241
present various ways of unifying the manifold in relation to the “I.” 255 Stated differently, the forms of judgment present the various processes by which the “I” unifies the manifold so as to become aware of its identity with itself as empirically actual. 256 So far we have seen that apperception – the awareness that “I = I” – requires both identity and difference. In the awareness that, “I see the cup on the table,” and that “I see the cup is half-full,” we have the identity of the “I” and the difference presented by the content, the difference between the “cup’s being on the table” and the “cup’s being half- full.” Hegel argues that we must grasp the essential unity of this identity and these differences. In order to grasp the nature of the “I,” we must recognize both the sense in which the “I = I,” and, at the same time, the sense in which the “I ≠ I” or “I = not-I.” The phrase, “at the same time,” indicates that we must grasp the essential and reciprocal relation between these two senses or moments. In one sense, “I = I.” The “I” that sees the cup on the table can recognize itself as the same “I” that sees that the cup is half full. However, Hegel argues that we cannot fully abstract the “I” that sees the cup on the table from the representation that the cup is on the table. Likewise, we cannot fully abstract the “I” that sees that the cup is half full from the representation that the cup is half full. This is the thought expressed by the claim “I = not-I.” Here the symbol “=” expresses the fact that the “I” is essentially 255 On Hegel’s interpretation of Kant, the categories or forms of judgment present “the modes” in which the “I” becomes aware of its own identity amidst the plurality of representations. Speaking of Kant, Hegel says: “The specific modes by which the Ego refers to itself the multiplicity of sense are the pure concepts of the understanding, the Categories” (Encyclopedia Logic, paragraph 42). Hegel follows Kant in this regard. 256 Hegel sees the relationship between the transcendental unity of apperception and the empirical unity of apperception in terms of the relation between potentiality and actuality, or, metaphorically speaking, in terms of the relation between the seed and the fully developed plant. The transcendental unity of apperception presents the implicit basis for the possibility of an empirically developed apperception. If the “I” were not already implicitly aware of its identity in all of its representations, all of its representations would not exist for it, and it would therefore not have the ability to explicitly recognize them as its own. 242
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THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENC
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Michael Eugene Morris in terms of c
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1.1) Preliminary Remarks………
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7) Essay on Natural Right: The Unit
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interpret these issues as an expres
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even “naively metaphysical.” 4
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immanent metaphysics. Insofar as He
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consciousness.” 13 Thus the Scien
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all genuine objects consist in some
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This section does not explain the m
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transitions from abstract right to
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The second moment of the will is th
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self as “pure infinity,” thus d
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will and the third part of the book
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3.2) The Notion: Substance as Subje
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is movement towards a “purpose.
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Therefore he argues we must replace
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judgment of the plant. The illustra
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the Encyclopedia, Hegel describes t
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colorful - but ultimately justified
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constituted in terms of the same ba
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provides the basic categories in te
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3.5) The “I” as Instantiation o
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of the self are genuine moments rat
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moments of the will. With regard to
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Before examining these issues, we s
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the third moment of the will, the m
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1.1) Preliminary Remarks CHAPTER TW
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certain traditional conceptions of
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conception that considers a thing a
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thing is “nothing.” Thus Bradle
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crucial ways. 71 Moreover, we are n
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From this brief survey, the followi
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If we can think of the thing’s qu
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and concrete, each object strives t
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different ways as his philosophy pr
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insists that truth comes in degrees
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necessary, therefore, if we use the
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Hegel believes that truth and falsi
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Hegel even insists that physical an
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2.4) The Degrees of Truth Ascribed
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more developed form of unity. A spe
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instantiated. The tree has thousand
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proximate truth of that from which
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higher kinds. The most general univ
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the solution. The next highest kind
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In the most general and abstract te
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The unity of identity and differenc
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of identity and difference, reason
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evident in the processes of life. M
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In accordance with the interpretati
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Third, we have the moment that unit
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category of ontology helps to make
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CHAPTER THREE THE NATURE OF GENUINE
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Our discussion of these phenomena s
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Two will briefly consider Hegel sol
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2.2) Difference, Identity, and Unit
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The second and third moments distin
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The moments of identity and differe
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The structure of judgment presents
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is red.” In this judgment, the su
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“identity” and “connection.
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interpretation assumes that “is
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judgments present the most develope
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emains unclear. However, it should
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speculation grasps the unity that u
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that is also a connecting. Thus jud
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Judgment obviously involves two men
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option presents judgment as the res
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5.4) Judgment Considered as a Serie
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we must carefully distinguish betwe
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all into the abyss of vacuity witho
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divides and articulates that which,
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5.5) Judgment Considered as a Serie
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as (b) a process that starts with u
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The essential requirement for the s
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Through this progress [which is als
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inhere in this substance. Thus we c
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conversely, the understanding const
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1) Introduction CHAPTER FOUR THE NA
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consider judgment as a series of ac
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Each judgment contains two obvious
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then there would be no basis for di
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In order to grasp the structure of
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In order to grasp the structure of
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corresponds to the way the object i
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contradicts it, this is to be recog
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make between different features of
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Here Hegel considers a conception o
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determining the exact nature of the
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moment of analysis. Moreover, we sa
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conception of the substance as subj
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says: “Only this self-restoring s
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elation to the unity that constitut
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instantiate their telos fully. Or,
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inextricably entwined with its othe
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epresentation to all objects. Moreo
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telos, and the telos can only be co
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can be defined in terms of some bio
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different from others. The desire t
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civil society. 330 The final senten
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point even more forcefully in his d
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Hegel’s view, the contradictions
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which the individual participates,
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argument, and on the basis of this
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HEGEL'S WORKS BIBLIOGRAPHY Werke. F
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Fulda, Hans Friedrich. (1978) “He
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Neuhouser, Frederick. (2000) Founda
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