THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

5.4) Judgment Considered as a Series of Mental Acts: The Irreducibility of
Synthesis and Analysis
Hegel rejects both of these conceptions of judgment. He argues that the acts of
judgment cannot all be reduced to acts of synthesis; nor can they all be reduced to acts of
analysis. In other words, the mind does not simply synthesize what is given as discrete,
nor does it simply analyze what is given as one. Once we recognize the implications of
Hegel’s view that both synthesis and analysis present irreducible kinds of mental acts, we
will be able to see the importance of the third moment of judgment, the moment that
unites or grounds synthesis and analysis, identity and difference.
In his discussion of judgment, Hegel repeatedly criticizes the view that judgment
can be explained merely as an act of synthesis, as an act that combines two independent
concepts (or impressions, properties, features of the world, etc.). He rejects the claim that
the distinction between the subject and the predicate precedes the act of unification
expressed by the copula. He says: “One’s first impression about the Judgment is the
independence of the two extremes, the subject and the predicate.” 135 On this view, the
subject-concept and the predicate-concept are given as fully formed and distinct, prior to
the unifying act of judgment. The unifying act of judgment simply takes what is given
and unifies it in terms of certain principles. Hegel rejects this view, arguing that the
elements synthesized in judgment only exist in relation to the act of synthesis. He says:
It is…false to speak of a combination of the two sides in judgment, if we
understand the term ‘combination’ to imply the independent existence of the
combining members apart from the combination. 136
135 Encyclopedia Logic, paragraph 166.
136 Encyclopedia Logic, paragraph 166Z.
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