THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

of the notion more generally. For the moment, though, it is sufficient to note the
terminological similarities between Hegel’s discussion of the “I” and his discussion of the
will in the “Introduction” to the Philosophy of Right.
Hegel describes the moments of the “I” in terms of the same dichotomies that
characterize the will. The first moment of the “I” consists in an “abstraction from all
determinateness and content.” Thus like the first moment of the will, the first moment of
the “I” is indeterminate and without content. Hegel goes on to describe the second
moment of the “I” as “absolutely determined.” Like the second moment of the will, this
moment of the “I” is determinate. Here we see the structure of the “I,” which is also the
structure of the notion, described in terms of the distinction between indeterminacy and
determinacy. Hegel also describes the “I” in terms of the distinction between the
universal and the individual. While the first moment presents the “I” in its universality,
the second moment presents the “I” in its individuality. 57
In the final sentence of this passage Hegel says that the unity of these two
moments, “constitutes the nature of the I as well as of the notion.” The structures of the
“I” and the structures of the notion are the same. Stated differently, the “I” presents the
highest instantiation of the notion. Hegel also makes a complex point about the unity of
the first two moments of the “I.” He warns that we cannot comprehend the nature of the
“I” unless we grasp its moments “in their abstraction” and “in their perfect unity” at “the
same time.” This warning highlights a complex problem, one that receives a great deal of
attention in the chapters that follow. The problem arises from the fact that the moments
57 Here we see a slight difference between Hegel’s characterization of the “I” and his
characterization of the will. Hegel describes the first and second moment of the will in terms of
universality and particularity, and he describes the unity of these two moments as individuality. Here,
Hegel describes the first two moments of the “I” in terms of universality and individuality.
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