THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

Similarly, if a judgment is insignificant, it is also defective. In order to be meaningful, a
judgment must involve some difference. In order, to be true, it must involve some
identity.
The relation between the significance of a judgment and the moment of difference
is relatively easy to see. In a significant judgment, one that is more than an immediately
evident tautology, there must be some difference between the subject and the predicate. 115
As Hegel often repeats, judgments such as “A tree is a tree,” or “Gold is gold,” lack
significance. 116 Such judgments are clearly true, but they are insignificant. In order for a
judgment to convey significance, there must be at least be some difference between the
subject term and the predicate term. 117
In a true judgment, there must be some form of unity, identity, or connection
between the subject and the predicate. 118 Consider, for instance, the judgment, “the rose
115 It is important to note the very general sense in which Hegel considers judgment, and the very
general meaning that he ascribes the terms “subject” and “predicate.” At the outset of his discussion of
judgment, Hegel claims that the terms “subject” and “predicate,” in their most general sense, are simply
names that designate two distinct features or determinations of the world. He says: “It is therefore
appropriate and necessary to have these names, subject and predicate for the determinations of the
judgment; as names, they are something indeterminate that still awaits its determination and are, therefore,
no more than names” (Science of Logic, p. 624). At the most general level, the structure of judgment
presents the most basic acts of thought – the act of analysis and the act of synthesis. At this general level,
the terms “subject” and “predicate” simply designate the results of analysis, while the copula expresses the
relation or synthesis.
116 See, for instance, the Science of Logic, p. 415. One might even go further and claim that, in
some important sense, such judgments are meaningless. These judgments do convey meaning, but this
meaning is completely parasitic on other judgments. The judgment, “a tree is a tree,” adds no new content
or meaning to our concept “tree.” In this sense, the meaning contained in this judgment derives entirely
from other judgments in which the concept “tree” is employed.
117 This is a necessary though not sufficient condition for the significance of a judgment.
118 This isn’t always the case. In negative judgments, the truth of the judgment stems from the
lack of connection between the two terms. The truth of the judgment, “the rose is not blue,” stems from the
fact that there is no connection between the two terms. Hegel could admit this and simply claim that the
negative judgment is a kind of defective judgment, one that has its telos in the more standard, positive form
of judgment. In and of themselves, negative judgments have very little value. There value comes from (a)
demonstrating the falsity of some positive judgment, and/or (b) from helping us to arrive at a positive
113