THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

necessary condition for the possibility of geometry as a synthetic a priori branch of
knowledge.
It should be noted that this transcendental argument does not alter our
understanding of geometry, nor does it transform our understanding of terms such as
“synthetic” and “a priori.” So while this transcendental argument provides the necessary
conditions for the synthetic a priori truths of geometry, it does not transform our
understanding of these truths. Transcendental arguments, at least as Kant employs them,
do not involve the hermeneutic moment of reinterpretation, the moment that Hegel
identifies with the negative meaning of sublation. Thus an account of the dialectic as a
transcendental argument emphasizes the additive or positive meaning of sublation at the
expense of the negative meaning. Of course it might be possible to develop some non-
Kantian form of transcendental argument that does include a hermeneutic moment of
reinterpretation. However, such a conception of the dialectic would weaken the claim
that Hegel merely seeks to complete the liberal tradition, since it would force us to admit
that, as they stand, the discussions of abstract right and morality are not merely
incomplete but also involve some element of distortion.
Our conception of the dialectic as a hermeneutic process explains the dual
meaning of the term sublation. The dialectic proceeds from part to whole. In this process
the parts are maintained, but their meaning is transformed, sometimes radically. The two
previously cited passages present another peculiar aspect of the process of sublation. In
the first passage, Hegel says that something is “sublated only in so far as it has entered
into unity with its opposite.” The dialectic uncovers the deeper or more foundational
unities that structure the basic dichotomies of our thought. Each stage of the dialectic
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