THE UNITY OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE AS THE ...

object is many as two abstractions from the unified action that constitutes the thing. If,
however, we take the sense in which the object is one and the sense in which the object is
many as two different ways of conceiving the thing, then we end up treating the thing as
three distinct entities. On this analysis, we have (a) our concept or idea of the thing as
many, (b) our concept or idea of the thing as one, and (c) the thing itself. Each of these
moments, on this analysis, is distinct from the others. Moreover, in their respective
independence, each of these moments becomes a distinct thing.
From the preceding considerations two points become clear. First, we should not
construe the sense in which the thing is one and the sense in which the thing is many as
two different ways that the object may be considered. Instead, we must construe these
two different senses as two ways in which the object exists, as two modes of the object’s
being. Second, it should now be clear that we should not explain the essential relation
between these two modes or ways of existing in terms of some third thing or entity, for as
we have seen, this merely adds further complications. We must explain the relationship
between the object as it is one and the object as it is many. We must explain how it is the
same object that is both one and many. However, our explanation should not sharply
distinguish the object from its oneness and its manyness, for this would merely create a
third or entity. It would merely create further distinctions that must ultimately be
resolved.
4) The Unity of the Object’s Modes of Being: A Sketch of Hegel’s Solution
In Chapter Three we considered the unity of identity and difference in relation to
the structure of judgment. We saw that judgment consists in a moment of synthesis and a
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